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> somewhat weak RSA key 2048-bit RSA is “weak”? If I understand things correctly, 2048-bit keys are considered safe for more than ten years still, and the des
by teddyh 8y ago
> somewhat weak RSA key
2048-bit RSA is “weak”? If I understand things correctly, 2048-bit keys are considered safe for more than ten years still, and the design of DNSSEC is such that the root keys can be rolled over at any time, so when the time comes, the key can simply be substitued for a stronger one.
And the comparison with X.509 is unsuitable. The DNSSEC root key could be compromised? How about the fact that if any CA loses its key, the entire X.509 system is vulnerable until that key can be revoked by every single end user?
- tptacek 8y ago2048 bit keys? What about all the 1024 bit keys that litter the DNSSEC PKI? How about the fact that CA keys can be revoked? Google and Mozilla killed one of the largest CAs in the market for misissuance. How do you kill .COM? You think if Symantec had a say in the matter, they'd let Google kill their CA business? How about the fact that weeks after the KSK roll, more than half the Internet still depends on the old root key?
- teddyh 8y ago> What about all the 1024 bit keys that litter the DNSSEC PKI? You’re moving the goalposts. The parent comment was explicitly about the root key. Yes, there are still weak keys below the root, just as there are still weak certifikates with MD5 hashes out there, but that is neither here nor there.
- tptacek 8y agoNo, modern browsers won't honor MD5 (or, for that matter SHA-1) certificates. But there's nothing they can do about 1024 bit RSA keys in DNSSEC. Starting to see the pattern?
- akerl_ 8y agoJust to clarify, bluejekyll referred to the root keys as a "somewhat weak RSA key", you pointed out that the root keys are 2048 bit, and tptacek responded pointing out that while the root keys are 2048 bit, the chain between them and basically any site with DNSSEC has 1024 bit keys involved. That's not really "moving the goalpost", so much as "a conversation involving more than 2 people". I pulled up the chain for cloudflare.com on the grounds that they'd care more than the average site about DNSSEC, and here was the result: http://dnsviz.net/d/cloudflare.com/dnssec/ http://dnsviz.net/d/cloudflare.com/dnssec/ So that's a 2048 bit root, and then as the chain passes through .com there's a 1024 bit RSA key, and then they have ECC keys for their zone. If their TLS cert had a hop in the chain that used MD5 hashes, Chrome would be refusing to trust their site.
- teddyh 8y agoFirstly, now that the root has a 2048 bit key, I predict that the rest of the TLDs will follow soonish. Previously, the concept was unproven, but now that it has been proven to work, I assume that keys will be rolled and progress will be made. Secondly, as I understand it, a 1024-bit RSA key, while not recommended, is still vastly more secure than an MD5 hash.
- tptacek 8y agoPeople have been predicting that since before Adam Langley wrote "Why Not Dane In Browsers", and making excuses about the keys that are there. Nobody denies that a 1024 bit RSA key is less bad than an MD5 certificate; it's still quite bad, and, personally, I'd argue, the worst kind of bad --- the kind of flaw that motivates large capital and operational expenditures at intelligence agencies.
- belorn 8y agoAre you saying that with the right amount of budget a 1024 RSA key can be broken today?
- tptacek 8y agoYes, of course I am. I'd be repeating something Eran Tromer said 10 years ago.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- teddyh 8y agoEven if every key below the root were 1024 bits, why would this be an argument against the concept of DNSSEC in general? DNSSEC keys can, by design, be rolled and replaced, and people will replace them as soon as they feel it is reasonably safe to do so. The perfect is the enemy of the good. What is the intended result of advocating for choosing not to adopt DNSSEC? Is this intended result actually likely, or is it more like a boycott for the principle of the thing?
- bluejekyll 8y agoSorry, weak was perhaps the wrong term, it’s more the management that’s at issue. You can see the sibling comments that of course argue that perspective more accurately.
- teddyh 8y ago> Sorry, weak was perhaps the wrong term, it’s more the management that’s at issue. “weak” was about half of your original argument: > The general argument is that X509 with TLS is enough authentication of a site one is connecting to, and therefor DNSSEC being somewhat weak, is something unnecessary. If we discount “weak”, let me then reply to the remainder of it: Firstly, DNSSEC is not only for web traffic, DNSSEC secures DNS for everything which uses domain names to locate services, not only HTTP. This is a big deal not only for more obscure (not to mention future) protocols, but also for sending e-mail, the MX lookup phase of which is otherwise unsecured. Secondly, the general problem with X.509 with rogue CA’s remain, and the only counter I have seen is akin to “but we can close those barn doors really well after each individual horses escape”, and I remain unconvinced. Thirdly, how do you prove you own a domain enough to get a X.509 certificate? You answer DNS requests, which is spoofable unless secured by DNSSEC.
- tptacek 8y agoOne of the two major remaining use cases for DNSSEC was in protecting mail infrastructure, which has a less-sophisticated PKI (for lack of a better term) than the web. But the major mail providers --- including Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft --- have given up on DNSSEC (note that none of them are DNSSEC-signed) and have together generated SMTP-STS, which does for SMTP what HSTS does for websites: after a first rendezvous connection, all subsequent connections are protected by continuity rules rather than policy. The SMTP-STS standard is explicit that it is motivated by the desire not to rely on DNSSEC. The other major use case for DNSSEC is, as you suggest, protecting DV verification. But in the long term, DNS is going to get factored out of domain verification entirely. CAs will eventually (who knows how long it will take, even though the protocols are there) just verify domains directly with registrars using something built on RDAP. In the meantime, there are countermeasures against DNS spoofing (that have the virtue of also working against BGP spoofing, which DNSSEC doesn't fix) that the CAs can (and gradually do) deploy. It's hard to see the justification for rolling out an expensive, inferior protocol to mitigate attacks that we're already adequately mitigating today and will in the future decisively address through other means.