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X.509 CA’s are problematic precisely because any one of them, no matter how sketchy, can issue certificates for any name. DNSSEC does not have that problem: TL
by teddyh 8y ago
X.509 CA’s are problematic precisely because any one of them, no matter how sketchy, can issue certificates for any name. DNSSEC does not have that problem: TLD’s in DNSSEC are restricted to their TLD, and you can decide yourself if you trust the domains in the hypothetical “.sketchy” TLD to be properly DNSSEC signed.
- tptacek 8y agoAnd every one of them can be monitored and will be killed if they mis-issue. If Google can kill Thawte, VeriSign, Equifax, GeoTrust, and RapidSSL, what hope does some random small CA have? The same thing is absolutely not the case of TLD owners. There is no mechanism at all to "revoke" them. You can't "distrust" them without the entire TLD vanishing from the Internet.
- toast0 8y agoOn the other hand, we implicitly trust the TLD owners to not just take over whatever domains they want. If they change the NS records, they can get a cert issued from their choice of CA, and the CA didn't misissue. It seems to me, that we would be in a better place with additional explicit trust on TLD providers, eventually leading towards not needing to trust external CAs.
- tptacek 8y agoI don't even understand the premise of this argument. You're in effect saying that we should replace commercial trust roots that are accountable to browser vendors with government-run trust roots accountable to no-one. How could that be an improvement?
- toast0 8y agoMy argument is, the TLDs already fully control the domain. Given that they fully control the domain, they can use that to request issuance of a domain controlled certificate. If at the end of the day, the TLD controls everything, I'd rather not have anybody else to worry about.
- tptacek 8y agoThat's not true. If Verisign tomorrow altered .COM to temporarily claim a Google name sufficient to acquire a DV Google.com cert, the CA that issued that certificate would be dead the next day.
- toast0 8y agoThat's great if you're Google, but if neustar took over my .org domain, any CA would be happy to issue, and I'd be SOL. I don't see a whole lot of difference between that and if they take over my .org and that enables them to issue certs directly through DANE or whatever.
- tptacek 8y agoI don't know what to tell you other than that the mechanisms I'm talking about that protect companies like Google have done more to directly protect smaller companies from these same attacks than DNSSEC has in the 24(!) years(!) Internet standards people have been working on it.
- tialaramex 8y agoEven better, a good CA will actually ask the TLD operator's own authoritative name servers directly for this record - so they can lie specifically to the CA and nobody else, the only record of this bogus response is held by the CA that will be accused of mis-issuance. It's like a locked room mystery. Nobody has admitted to doing this at the TLD level, most of those people take their jobs too seriously to mess with some nobody, but it has been done down at eTLD+1 several times, and of course it's effective. So yes, there is every reason to expect that this could be done by a TLD registry operator.