3 ms·

The statement that the sum of the parts if different from the sum of the parts that it used to be turns a secure system into an insecure system is false. The ar

The statement that the sum of the parts if different from the sum of the parts that it used to be turns a secure system into an insecure system is false. The article seems to equate changes in parts to a less secure environment against any threat model, which is universally false.

acqq 8y ago
That is was never the argument of the article. Let me simplify it, as I see it's missed completely: Until iOS 11 what existed was 1) your "digital identity" by Apple (Apple ID and Apple ID password) 2) your "physical identity" (fingerprint) stored only at the device(s) and impossible to extract. 3) the "device key" that allowed the access to the device, but not to the (1) And they were separated. Since iOS 11, snooping the (3) and stealing the device is completely enough to overtake (1). Before iOS 11, that was simply not possible. That's the whole point of the article I've quoted: if I just simply see which passcode you type and then I get an access to your device, you lose your Apple ID and everything it protects but that is not on your device. It your Apple ID doesn't protect some additional material that is not on that single device, you don't have to care. If it does, it does make a difference. It's real. And it's on topic. The post to which I've replied claimed: "Someone would need my apple id, my password, access to one of my apple devices (I had to enter a code that appeared on one of my devices" ( https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18241224 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18241224 ) Whereas in fact since iOS 11, somebody needs just access to one of his devices and the passcode, Apple ID and the password he can obtain having only the passcode and the device, since iOS 11.
- oneplane 8y ago
  It was a response to mirkules's fear that this might be a big target and your response on that, that according to Elcomsoft, the sum of changes would make this a weaker target. This is false. While you can probably always find a scenario or edge case where it would not be strictly false, in general and within the threat model of 99.99999% of the users, it is still false.
  - acqq 8y ago
    Once again, no. It was response to "Someone would need my apple id, my password, access to one of my apple devices." The Elcomsoft's article explicitly claims that no, you don't need Apple Id and password when you have an access to the device and the passcode. And nobody was able to disprove these very specific claims that are the actual topic of Elcomsoft's article. What you assert, in the words you assert "the sum of changes would make this a weaker target", was claimed nowhere as the "argument". From the two paragraphs I've quoted the first was a mere introduction (how the reduced security level was achieved, specifically, "Combined together, these seemingly small changes made devastating synergy", and yes, such changes can actually make the system easier to exploit, everybody wit experience in this field knows that). The second was explicit: "The passcode. This is all that’s left of iOS security in iOS 11. If the attacker has your iPhone and your passcode is compromised, you lose your data" It was just your interpretation, based only on one of the only two paragraphs I've quoted (and your unawareness of both the second paragraph and the whole article) which obviously missed the whole point. Yes, the user "convenience" decisions did lead to having the Apple Id password irrelevant (obtainable by just a plain and typically simpler passcode). Sorry that you missed that. Any I won't reply to this thread anymore, because I've written all the arguments. Anybody can check the whole thread and compare. And yes, also read the Elcomsoft's article and prove them wrong, if they are wrong. But I haven't seen anybody achieving that up to now.
    - oneplane 8y ago
      You keep repeating yourself and missing the point, which is: no, it does not matter and does not change the overall security of pretty much all users. It is simply not within the threat model. Unless you have to consider a technically advanced adversary or highly automated attacks, it's simply still not relevant. None of the iOS related things apply to the download portal, and none of the intercept/local access exploits apply to normal users.
      - acqq 8y ago
        > it's simply still not relevant It is absolutely relevant for this very thread: it disproves the initial claim in the thread that the attacker would need “device, passcode and appleid password”. The article proves that the third (appleid password) is not needed (that was the main topic of the article) and you never demontrated anything else. I don’t care for other kinds of relevance or irrelevance as they never were never claimed by me.

acqq 8y ago

That is was never the argument of the article. Let me simplify it, as I see it's missed completely: Until iOS 11 what existed was 1) your "digital identity" by Apple (Apple ID and Apple ID password) 2) your "physical identity" (fingerprint) stored only at the device(s) and impossible to extract. 3) the "device key" that allowed the access to the device, but not to the (1) And they were separated. Since iOS 11, snooping the (3) and stealing the device is completely enough to overtake (1). Before iOS 11, that was simply not possible. That's the whole point of the article I've quoted: if I just simply see which passcode you type and then I get an access to your device, you lose your Apple ID and everything it protects but that is not on your device. It your Apple ID doesn't protect some additional material that is not on that single device, you don't have to care. If it does, it does make a difference. It's real. And it's on topic. The post to which I've replied claimed: "Someone would need my apple id, my password, access to one of my apple devices (I had to enter a code that appeared on one of my devices" ( https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18241224 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18241224 ) Whereas in fact since iOS 11, somebody needs just access to one of his devices and the passcode, Apple ID and the password he can obtain having only the passcode and the device, since iOS 11.

oneplane 8y ago
It was a response to mirkules's fear that this might be a big target and your response on that, that according to Elcomsoft, the sum of changes would make this a weaker target. This is false. While you can probably always find a scenario or edge case where it would not be strictly false, in general and within the threat model of 99.99999% of the users, it is still false.
- acqq 8y ago
  Once again, no. It was response to "Someone would need my apple id, my password, access to one of my apple devices." The Elcomsoft's article explicitly claims that no, you don't need Apple Id and password when you have an access to the device and the passcode. And nobody was able to disprove these very specific claims that are the actual topic of Elcomsoft's article. What you assert, in the words you assert "the sum of changes would make this a weaker target", was claimed nowhere as the "argument". From the two paragraphs I've quoted the first was a mere introduction (how the reduced security level was achieved, specifically, "Combined together, these seemingly small changes made devastating synergy", and yes, such changes can actually make the system easier to exploit, everybody wit experience in this field knows that). The second was explicit: "The passcode. This is all that’s left of iOS security in iOS 11. If the attacker has your iPhone and your passcode is compromised, you lose your data" It was just your interpretation, based only on one of the only two paragraphs I've quoted (and your unawareness of both the second paragraph and the whole article) which obviously missed the whole point. Yes, the user "convenience" decisions did lead to having the Apple Id password irrelevant (obtainable by just a plain and typically simpler passcode). Sorry that you missed that. Any I won't reply to this thread anymore, because I've written all the arguments. Anybody can check the whole thread and compare. And yes, also read the Elcomsoft's article and prove them wrong, if they are wrong. But I haven't seen anybody achieving that up to now.
  - oneplane 8y ago
    You keep repeating yourself and missing the point, which is: no, it does not matter and does not change the overall security of pretty much all users. It is simply not within the threat model. Unless you have to consider a technically advanced adversary or highly automated attacks, it's simply still not relevant. None of the iOS related things apply to the download portal, and none of the intercept/local access exploits apply to normal users.
    - acqq 8y ago
      > it's simply still not relevant It is absolutely relevant for this very thread: it disproves the initial claim in the thread that the attacker would need “device, passcode and appleid password”. The article proves that the third (appleid password) is not needed (that was the main topic of the article) and you never demontrated anything else. I don’t care for other kinds of relevance or irrelevance as they never were never claimed by me.