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I wonder if "Don't do password-authenticated key exchange." is still "Cryptographic right answer"; does OPAQUE address the reservations that tptacek had back in
by zokier 8y ago
I wonder if "Don't do password-authenticated key exchange." is still "Cryptographic right answer"; does OPAQUE address the reservations that tptacek had back in the day
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9593916#9594731 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9593916#9594731
- tptacek 8y agoNo, not at all. OPAQUE addresses problems Green has with SRP, not the problems I have.
- aidenn0 8y agoWPA-3 is using a PAKE, ignoring the fact that there are some concerns about the specific PAKE used, do you think a PAKE buys anything in that use case?
- lvh 8y agoIt's pretty decent for the WiFi use case, but you could actually do something cooler with a symmetric PAKE if your WiFi device had a display. Pick a short random password, copy it over to the client, do SPAKE2. You now have a unique, high entropy secret -- and you have strong guarantees no-one else has that secret (an attacker can guess, but there's a tiny time window for them to do so, and the honest participants are immediately convinced foul play occurred). As it stands, the PAKE is better than what they had, but not ridiculously better in the way U2F is over TOTP for example.
- fileworm 8y agoOK, what are the problems you have with password-authenticated key exchange?