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> The other angle is one of the recently discovered side-channel attacks that can occur when hyper-threading is in action. By disabling hyper-threading on the v
by martinpw 8y ago
> The other angle is one of the recently discovered side-channel attacks that can occur when hyper-threading is in action. By disabling hyper-threading on the volume production chips, this security issue is no longer present.
This line of reasoning feels unconvincing. If there were really worried about this they should disable it everywhere.
- derefr 8y agoThere's no conceptual vulnerability if the system the chip is being integrated into isn't multi-tenant (where a "tenant" can be a literal time-share user, or something like a website's Javascript code executing in a web browser.) So: cloud computing, and consumers that might be running dumb code from the internet (= i{3,5,7} and Xeon = volume production) should get chips with no hyperthreading; while HPC, locked-down workstations, and gaming PCs that probably don't have any important data on them (= i9 = low-batch-size production) should get chips with hyperthreading.
- Coding_Cat 8y agoUnfortunately, it's the multi-tenant applications that tend to gain the most from hyperthreading. For HPC it's usually turned off, and I think for gaming and workstations it also has little if any use.
- derefr 8y agoI think I've seen either Intel or AMD explain hyperthreads as being useful in the case of a gamer who is also using a software encoder to stream their gameplay. Also, HPC doesn't necessarily imply a uniform workload; it just implies that all workloads are trusted. Really, modern HPC clusters are still "multi-tenant"; they're just tenants who are all e.g. employees of the same company, or researchers at the same university. So you can describe them, from a security perspective, as one "tenant." None of them would have anything to gain by doing a side-channel attack against one-another.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]