4 ms·
Thomas Ptacek (the guy whose blog post you've linked) agrees with Thomas Ptacek (tptacek, the guy whose sub-thread you're replying to)? Not exactly a revelation
by tialaramex 8y ago
Thomas Ptacek (the guy whose blog post you've linked) agrees with Thomas Ptacek (tptacek, the guy whose sub-thread you're replying to)? Not exactly a revelation.
Also Thomas has rejected the suggestion that the parts of his post that are now hopelessly wrong should be mentioned in the FAQ he prominently links. So, that post is wrong and explicitly won't be fixed, you should not rely on the "facts" in it unless you want to get laughed at.
Your mention of Comodo suggests you're badly confused. The Symantec hierarchy is in the process of being distrusted by the Mozilla and Google root programmes, not Comodo.
As to .com, it already _is_ run very badly and we already do have to put up with that because there is no way to fix it. Don't put new things in .com unless you're comfortable with for-profit companies screwing you over whenever it suits them. DNSSEC can't make that worse, it's already terrible.
That's worth emphasising - DNSSEC cannot make you more dependent on your registry operators, because you are already entirely dependent on those registry operators anyway. If the operator could be leaned on by spooks (seems plausible) that is already true today.
- dagenix 8y ago> Thomas Ptacek (the guy whose blog post you've linked) agrees with Thomas Ptacek (tptacek, the guy whose sub-thread you're replying to)? Not exactly a revelation. Lol, I didn't read the username. > So, that post is wrong and explicitly won't be fixed, you should not rely on the "facts" in it unless you want to get laughed at. I haven't analyzed everything in that blog post. However, the case it makes against DANE I think is convincing. I linked to that blog post since it was the one that made me realized that DANE was a bad idea when I was briefly a DANE enthusiast a few years ago. > Your mention of Comodo suggests you're badly confused. I accidentally slipped and used the wrong CA - I think "badly confused" is a bit strong for a slip of the tounge. > Don't put new things in .com unless you're comfortable with for-profit companies screwing you over whenever it suits them. It sound like you are also arguing that DANE is a bad idea. > DNSSEC can't make that worse, it's already terrible. I don't think I said anything to the contrary. I'm real confused by the aggressive tone - it seems like you agree with everything of substance I wrote and the things you don't agree with are things that I didn't actually say.
- tptacek 8y agoYou keep alluding to parts of that post that are outdated, but you never provide specifics. I appreciate and will remember the concession that security for .COM is hopeless.
- tialaramex 8y agoActually I keep providing specifics which you ignore, for example the blog post declares that DNSSEC is "unsafe" because it can cause hostnames to be revealed and you give the example of Bank of America, owners of the bankofamerica.com domain for which you say such a policy "does not work so well". But today actually FQDNs like 14021-nonprod.bankofamerica.com or whkgm04ye.hktskcy.apac.bankofamerica.com are not just accessible if you brute force DNS, they're automatically published, because Bank of America heavily relies, in fact, on the Web PKI and its issuers log the certificates. It seems very strange to focus on the security for .COM when my point is that that entire TLD is badly run, it's like you're focused on how good the lock is on the front door (somebody call Deviant Ollam) at Lehman Brothers when the actual problem was they've invested all this money in worthless mortgage securities.
- tptacek 8y agoThat's simply false. Bank of America's public servers with TLS certificates are logged (which, by the way, is also an operational security problem for them), but their other services are not. You've picked an odd point to quibble with, since there's not only NSEC and NSEC3 but now, after the last RWC, a proposed NSEC5 to address this supposed non-problem.