> In this way quantum suicide is not really exploitable, as the vast majority of "your" measure will be in worlds where you find quantum suicide to be unappeali

> In this way quantum suicide is not really exploitable, as the vast majority of "your" measure will be in worlds where you find quantum suicide to be unappealing. Unappealing is subjective, though. Sure, the vast majority of "your" measure will be in worlds where quantum suicide will kill you. But there is no reason you can't think of "I will be dead but some version of me will be alive in another universe" as an appealing scenario. As a thought experiment, suppose that instead of involving quantum mechanics, you were an emulated mind capable of making an exact copy of yourself in this universe. And, for some reason, someone is willing to give you money in exchange for you copying yourself and then immediately deleting one of the copies at random. In a lot of ways this looks similar to the quantum lottery scenario: "you" will split into two copies, one will end up dead, and the other will end up richer. One difference is that in the quantum scenario, you're leaving behind a whole universe without you in it, whereas in the emulation scenario, the universe will end up with one copy of you either way. But if you don't care about the universe, only yourself, then that wouldn't matter to you. Another difference is the alternative if you choose not to perform the experiment: two copies of yourself (or a self with twice as large a measure) in the quantum scenario, one in the emulation scenario. But then, as an emulation, you could just decide to copy yourself and not delete one of the copies. Normally, that would be pretty different, since the two copies of you would have to interact with each other, perhaps compete for the same resources, while two quantum copies exist fully independently of each other. But you could imagine sending one of the copies off at lightspeed to some distant place, with no intent to ever communicate with the copy again – heck, you could theoretically send the copy beyond the cosmic event horizon so that it's physically impossible to ever communicate again. There wouldn't be anything wrong with doing that – but if you decided "nah, I don't feel like it; one of me is enough for this universe", you can't say that would be irrational or suicidal. So, in the quantum scenario, why should you prefer having two of you (by not doing the experiment) over having one (by doing it)?