here is a quick outline of some issues in php through the years: http://phpxmlrpc.sourceforge.net/#security http://phpxmlrpc.sourceforge.net/#security early an

here is a quick outline of some issues in php through the years: http://phpxmlrpc.sourceforge.net/#security http://phpxmlrpc.sourceforge.net/#security early and naive implementations of xml parsers in php used eval, and as such were terribly insecure and hacked en masse http://php.net/manual/en/security.magicquotes.php http://php.net/manual/en/security.magicquotes.php -- man, if only we wrapped string on a ini file setting, it wouldn't prevent injection attacks at all, really all it means is that the standard library isn't portable any more as the semantics and return values can change on a site basis. http://php.net/manual/en/security.globals.php http://php.net/manual/en/security.globals.php 'you know what would be good if we could trash variables from the browser' 'we've turned it off now, good thing that people won't turn it back on for older scripts, and it will affect every script' http://php.net/manual/en/language.oop5.late-static-bindings.php http://php.net/manual/en/language.oop5.late-static-bindings.... - a dynamic language with an early bound oo implementation? sure we'll fix it, we'll just make the keyword for dynamic dispatch 'static' http://php.net/manual/en/language.namespaces.php http://php.net/manual/en/language.namespaces.php - the namespace character is the string escape character. I mean that will never backfire if people don't use 'variable functions', or using a string to lookup a function http://us.php.net/manual/en/functions.variable-functions.php http://us.php.net/manual/en/functions.variable-functions.php lets hope we never have to put old code that uses this into a namespace. http://php.net/manual/en/control-structures.goto.php http://php.net/manual/en/control-structures.goto.php man, should we implement a subset of goto or, should we do named breaks. nah goto is far more awesome. http://use.perl.org/~Aristotle/journal/33448 http://use.perl.org/~Aristotle/journal/33448 - how do we fix a security vulnerability? why checking to see if an int is bigger than INT_MAX www.trl.ibm.com/people/mich/pub/200901_popl2009phpsem.pdf - the implementation and semantics of php don't match up. it doesn't do what it says on the tin. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PHP_accelerator http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PHP_accelerator - php by default doesn't cache bytecode, unlike, nearly everything ever, for commercial reasons, as zend sell one as a product. http://www.phpcompiler.org/doc/phc-0.2.0.3/representingphp.html#CONCRETETREE http://www.phpcompiler.org/doc/phc-0.2.0.3/representingphp.h... - the grammar is terribly broken, so much so it is nearly impossible to do obvious and useful things like foo(1,2,3)[0] http://blog.php-security.org/archives/61-Retired-from-securityphp.net.html http://blog.php-security.org/archives/61-Retired-from-securi... the development team is toxic and reluctant to provide actual solutions for security there are many php builtins which have vague return values which change indeterminately between releases and arguments, which forces you to use == over === for some comparisons unless you want your code to break unexpectedly. the moral is: for everything they've fixed, they've often fixed by duct taping over the original errant feature. the standard library needs to be wrapped to be consistent. security or performance isn't a priority for the open source versions. this won't bite most web applications as many of them are simple templates around a database. with larger applications or frameworks, php struggles