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I just tried it. Someone would need my apple id, my password, access to one of my apple devices (I had to enter a code that appeared on one of my devices), and
by irrational 8y ago
I just tried it. Someone would need my apple id, my password, access to one of my apple devices (I had to enter a code that appeared on one of my devices), and access to my email. If someone already has all of that, I'm hosed no matter what.
- sambe 8y agoUnless there is a weakness in that authentication.
- ash_gti 8y agoThen they would have access to my iTunes account anyway...
- alttab 8y agoBut then they can easily exfiltrate, which would allow it to happen programmatically and in mass.
- irrational 8y agoWhich authentication? My password manager authentication? My email authentication? My apple device authentication?
- acqq 8y agohttps://blog.elcomsoft.com/2017/11/ios-11-horror-story-the-rise-and-fall-of-ios-security/ https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2017/11/ios-11-horror-story-the-r... "The release of iOS 11" ... "also made a number of other changes under the hood" ... "Each and every one of these changes was aimed at making the user’s life easier (as in “more convenience”), and each came with a small trade off in security. Combined together, these seemingly small changes made devastating synergy, effectively stripping each and every protection layer off the previously secure system." "The passcode. This is all that’s left of iOS security in iOS 11. If the attacker has your iPhone and your passcode is compromised, you lose your data; your passwords to third-party online accounts; your Apple ID password (and obviously the second authentication factor is not a problem). Finally, you lose access to all other Apple devices that are registered with your Apple ID; they can be wiped or locked remotely. All that, and more, just because of one passcode and stripped-down security in iOS 11." I don't know if it got any better with iOS 12.
- oneplane 8y agoElcomsoft is in the business of FUD to sell their software. While they are not wrong by default, this is one of their statements that is simply false.
- acqq 8y ago> false I’d still like to see anything that disproves their claims and support yours which appear to be unsupported. Elcomsoft documents in details what changed in the whole system. And the post was already discussed on HN and I haven’t seen anybody disproving it: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15822414 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15822414
- oneplane 8y agoThe statement that the sum of the parts if different from the sum of the parts that it used to be turns a secure system into an insecure system is false. The article seems to equate changes in parts to a less secure environment against any threat model, which is universally false.
- technofiend 8y agoThere's still a hole in Apple's user ID mapping that doesn't recognize first.last@gmail.com and firstlast@gmail.com are the same person and the e-mails go to the same place. If you accidentally approve creating an Apple ID that's some variation on your e-mail it opens up your account to human phishing attacks. Just call apple support and raise hell until someone makes a mistake. The RFC mentions dot-atoms in address elements are locally interpreted. There's no rule specifying if x.y.z or xyz are equivalent or not. The issue for me is that an Apple ID looks just like an e-mail address. x.y.z@gmail.com and xyz@gmail.com are equivalent to Gmail but not to Apple. From that I believe it creates an opportunity for confusion.
- joombaga 8y agoI don't understand. Can you describe the hole? It seems preferable to treat foo@gmail.com, fo.o@gmail.com, and foo+bar@gmail.com as different addresses.
- klodolph 8y agoWhat does this have to do with first.last@gmail.com being the same as firstlast@gmail.com? IMO the correct thing to do is treat the local part of the email address to be opaque.
- pathseeker 8y agoThat's not a hole. Those are different email addresses according to the email standard. How exactly would this attack even work that you have in mind? And wouldn't it even be easier to conduct this so-called attach on an email host that actually treats first.last@domain.com as a different email from firstlast@domain.com since it wouldn't even require the 'victim' to click anything in their email? The right answer is for Apple to keep treating them as separate emails and refuse to give people access to accounts with different email addresses. It's that simple.
- technofiend 8y ago>Those are different email addresses according to the email standard. Not really. It's left open to interpretation from my reading of the relevant RFC. The spec says the dot-atom form should be used but does not say in what way it should be used. Google collapses x.y.z@gmail and xyz@gmail.com to the same thing which is fine they're welcome to do so. However the Apple IDs x.y.z@gmail.com and xyz@gmail.com are entirely different entities. So we have a namespace collision in one space but not the other because although an Apple ID looks like an e-mail address it's not. I'm just saying that can create a problem. An addr-spec is a specific Internet identifier that contains a locally interpreted string followed by the at-sign character ("@", ASCII value 64) followed by an Internet domain. The locally interpreted string is either a quoted-string or a dot-atom. If the string can be represented as a dot-atom (that is, it contains no characters other than atext characters or "." surrounded by atext characters), then the dot-atom form SHOULD be used and the quoted- string form SHOULD NOT be used. Comments and folding white space SHOULD NOT be used around the "@" in the addr-spec.
- sandworm101 8y agoSo i cannot download my data without using an apple product? And that interaction will only add to the data? Seems like they just assume that all past customers are current customers too. And what of those who have onlh ever interacted with apple via work? Apple has thier data but they may not have access to the needed devices.
- xvector 8y agoThis is because of hardware-based encryption. It is physically impossible to retrieve a good deal of data without access to keys in one of your devices’ enclaves.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- drb91 8y agoWhat would you prefer?
- ovao 8y agoThe user to whom you’re replying most likely has Two-Step Verification enabled on their account, which is why they received a prompt on their Apple device. If you do not have an Apple device this particular step could not apply to you.
- tracker1 8y agoAnd once enabled, you can never disable... Heaven help you if you only have one device, and want to re-auth your account, to get rid of the nag prompts to login again.
- satysin 8y agoIt falls back to SMS for 2FA if you don't have a trusted device on the account (e.g. if you only have one device and are doing a reset of said device)
- beenBoutIT 8y agoSo IOW someone would just need your iPad.
- sedatk 8y agoUnlocked.
- martin_ 8y agoI was quite surprised it let me verify from the device I was actively using.. Is it really 2FA if it pops up the code on top of Chrome?
- Operyl 8y agoHow would it know it wasn't your current device? They'd have to leak some special data via Safari. Furthermore, does it matter? There's a fair chunk of users who only have one Apple device, capable of producing those codes, anyway. If the attacker already has an unlocked phone from the user, chances are they're already pwned anyway..
- blixt 8y ago2FA prevents people who successfully phished you (e.g., they managed to send you an email that opened a fake Google login page that you put your password into) from logging in with your username and password without being in your physical vicinity. 2FA popping up on your personal device that you authorized, even when that's the same device you're trying to log in on, doesn't reduce the security of that.
- TheForumTroll 8y agoAs this is HN I wouldn't think it necessary to state that that is how it is supposed to work.. but it never does. You should know that. It will be abused.