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> why would SMS-based 2FA be LESS secure than no 2FA at all for unsophisticated users It's not about the user, it's about the attacker. If your account has som
by StavrosK 8y ago
> why would SMS-based 2FA be LESS secure than no 2FA at all for unsophisticated users
It's not about the user, it's about the attacker. If your account has something worth bothering with, SMS 2FA is a way for an attacker to tell support "yes, I own the phone number, I just forgot the password", which gets the account transferred to the attacker more easily. It's a tradeoff between that and a keylogger meaning game over, but, really, how hard is it to implement TOTP?
> I think the author also fails to mention techniques for detecting account hijacking - Facebook and google for example both look at IP addresses and user agent strings, probably along with other factors, to detect unusual account activity.
That's a very good point, but those are more high-effort functions and only allow detection after the fact, rather than prevention. They're definitely great to have, but I wanted to show two simple features that can help your users' security greatly while being easy to implement.
- cal5k 8y agoWhat you’re saying about support indicates poor process rather than an issue with SMS per se. All password resets should require email verification... so an attacker would have to either compromise both the email account and the phone number, or the password and the phone number. It’s still not great - U2F is the way to go in my opinion - but good luck getting my dad to use any of that stuff.
- StavrosK 8y ago> good luck getting my dad to use any of that stuff That's exactly the reason for the "poor process", most users have trouble with these things and it's not uncommon for people to say "the email address I signed up with is old and I don't have it any more, but I do have my phone number". So common that support can't just ignore those, unfortunately, which is how attackers get in. That, and support staff are people and sometimes just want to help users, even though you've said "absolutely no password resets without email verification".
- cal5k 8y agoI understand the point of view, but it still smacks of weak process. Support should not be able to do anything other than trigger an email reset link. If they lost the email password, they need to take it up with their email provider. Otherwise a manual process involving ID verification of some type should be required to reset the email or phone number on the account. I’m not saying doing this properly is easy, but I think “don’t use SMS ever” is a bit extreme.
- StavrosK 8y agoThis is just offloading the responsibility for security to the email provider. If their security is weaker than yours, you've disadvantaged your users. If you have an easy way to do ID verification, that's great, but that's not always possible.
- jessaustin 8y agoIsn't email still the skeleton key? Most popular email providers can be secure enough for many uses. We could imagine e.g. a bank that hands out OTP devices to its high-value customers who bring passports to the bank, but that's overkill for many situations.
- jschwartzi 8y agoIdeally the manual process should require ID verification live and in-person, not over the phone. This raises the bar for an attacker from "has to have access to the Equifax hacked database" to "has to get a decent fake ID made before their appointment with the ID verification people."
- cal5k 8y agoThat's actually a really good point. I'm not sure what options are available in the US, but Canada Post has a service for exactly this purpose: https://www.canadapost.ca/cpc/en/business/postal-services/digital-proof-identity.page https://www.canadapost.ca/cpc/en/business/postal-services/di...
- cal5k 8y agoAlso, if we’re talking about high-security applications, it’s really not enough to focus on authentication. Detecting account hijacking can prevent an attacker from executing some damaging action (transferring money, buying stuff) even though the credentials might be compromised. I think user authentication needs to be a holistic process that looks at a bunch of factors.
- carbocation 8y ago> how hard is it to implement TOTP? I've been asking BofA and Merrill for awhile. Apparently for the institutions that control my money, "very."
- robotdan 8y agoIf you're a dev, there are a lot of implementations, or code examples online. Here is an open source Java example of some of the algorithm impl, and an HTML / JS example to test out in the browsers. https://github.com/inversoft/prime-two-factor/blob/master/src/main/java/org/primeframework/twofactor/TwoFactor.java https://github.com/inversoft/prime-two-factor/blob/master/sr... https://github.com/inversoft/prime-two-factor/tree/master/web https://github.com/inversoft/prime-two-factor/tree/master/we...
- carbocation 8y agoMy comment was made in the hopes that someone can interest financial institutions in real 2FA.
- tptacek 8y agoThe expense is in added support, not in software development cost.
- brokenwren 8y agoI don't think this is correct for most uses of SMS currently. 2FA (MFA) is on top of password authentication, not to the side of it. If you forget your password, 2FA does nothing to help you out. I think what you are talking about is "SMS password reset", which is a different beast. And it also sounds like you are talking about SMS based identity verification for customer service representatives. If you are only using SMS for identity verification in your CSR workflow, that is a broken workflow. In FusionAuth (https://fusionauth.io https://fusionauth.io), we implemented SMS MFA that only works after the user has successfully put in their password. Therefore, the attacker would need their password and a clone of their phone. While this is still possible, the threat surface is quite small.
- robotdan 8y agoWhat is FusionAuth? Is this like an Auth0 or something like that?
- brokenwren 8y agoSimilar to Auth0, except you can run it anywhere (dev-box, bare-metal, VPS, Docker, etc). It has all the features that most applications need. Plus, it's free for unlimited users.