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I like the first half of your comment. The second half, though - > On the other hand by hastening the end of the war and preventing future wars (by informing t

I like the first half of your comment. The second half, though - > On the other hand by hastening the end of the war and preventing future wars (by informing the public of the horrors), the upside is solid. Letting Iraq break into regional sectarian rule would be a disaster. Foreign forces need to be there until locally trained police and military forces are able to keep rule of law in Iraq. Letting the place become a failed state would be very bad for all parties involved from almost all perspectives - it would probably cost more American money and lives in the long run [1], and certainly would result in oppression, violence, and misery for Iraqis. [1] If a country gets a reputation for withdrawing under pressure if wars aren't won fast, that encourages enemies during a conflict to fight a slow war of attrition, which is the bloodiest, nastiest, most expensive kind of war. Now, the response to this might be "well, America shouldn't fight wars any more then!" - but, realistically looking at America's history and demographics, I would bet on continuing to have an armed conflict every 10-20 years or so. Those will become nastier and more drawn out if the United States gets a reputation for withdrawing if an insurgency causes problems long enough.

doron 16y ago
To your point [1] reputation has little if at all relevance here. The US largely employed a strategy of asymmetrical, anti-access, area-denial. shock and awe etc... in Iraq initial phase of the war. put simply, we see you on the field we turn you into vapor, essentially making open conflict with US forces a suicidal idea, because you can never match the fire power. This strategy, and not the reputation you talk about, is what encourages the enemy to fight an attrition, largely non kinetic war, over a long time, its simply a prudent logical approach to a fight against an enemy with far superior capabilities on the field Parts of the military recognized this, and hence the COIN doctrine was born, wining the battle is easy for the US military, it is done swiftly. wining security post conflict (re occupation) is something the US military had consistent problems with primarily due to the size and nature of the occupying forces (20 something marines make a very effective combat solider, but lousy and impatient occupier) Another way of putting it, is that the US does not need a great number of troops to win armed conflict scenarios, but require a great number of troops (of a different sort) to secure occupation, this was the point that general Eric Shinseki made at the time before congress, and was ridiculed for it by the neocon know it alls. I do agree with you that the US will continue to have an increasing number of low level armed conflicts around the world, It is the fist of globalization if you will.

doron 16y ago

To your point [1] reputation has little if at all relevance here. The US largely employed a strategy of asymmetrical, anti-access, area-denial. shock and awe etc... in Iraq initial phase of the war. put simply, we see you on the field we turn you into vapor, essentially making open conflict with US forces a suicidal idea, because you can never match the fire power. This strategy, and not the reputation you talk about, is what encourages the enemy to fight an attrition, largely non kinetic war, over a long time, its simply a prudent logical approach to a fight against an enemy with far superior capabilities on the field Parts of the military recognized this, and hence the COIN doctrine was born, wining the battle is easy for the US military, it is done swiftly. wining security post conflict (re occupation) is something the US military had consistent problems with primarily due to the size and nature of the occupying forces (20 something marines make a very effective combat solider, but lousy and impatient occupier) Another way of putting it, is that the US does not need a great number of troops to win armed conflict scenarios, but require a great number of troops (of a different sort) to secure occupation, this was the point that general Eric Shinseki made at the time before congress, and was ridiculed for it by the neocon know it alls. I do agree with you that the US will continue to have an increasing number of low level armed conflicts around the world, It is the fist of globalization if you will.