One time pads are theoretically more secure than any other form of encryption. If implemented correctly they offer information theoretic security, whereas moder

One time pads are theoretically more secure than any other form of encryption. If implemented correctly they offer information theoretic security, whereas modern encryption schemes can only provide computational security. Information theoretic security essentially means that we cannot learn anything whatsoever about a plaintext from a ciphertext. There exists no information leakage. In order to achieve this we need to 1) use an encryption key at least as long as the plaintext, 2) generate that key secure and (truly) randomly, and 3) never reuse that key for the duration of the session. Computational security was invented (in part) because this is a completely unrealistic ideal to strive for in approximately all communication. If I want to securely send you an plaintext with a size of 1GB, I need to first securely generate a truly random 1GB string and exchange that with you. Since that secure exchange would obviate the encryption in the first place, it's more likely I'd generate a significantly larger key and exchange that with you first, then only use as much of the key as necessary for each exchanged message in the session. This makes one time pads extremely inefficient - in order to achieve the information theoretic advantages of one time pads all messages must be doubled in size and no part of the key can ever encrypt the same part of the text. It's effectively a stream cipher. If you and I encrypt recurring metadata, or we reuse common idioms or greetings under the same key, we immediately lose information theoretic security. Then we're downgraded to a ridiculously inefficient stream cipher with computational security. At that point we might as well use AES, or ChaCha-Poly. One time pads are used (typically by the government), but it's very uncommon and reserved for areas where literally no expense is spared. The purpose of computational security is to make cryptography more efficient and practical via a simple tradeoff. We get disproportionately more efficiency back by accepting infeasibility instead of impossibility. Does that help clarify things for you?