I don't buy the regulation argument. Regulators will not have a sufficient understanding of the systems they are regulating, and of course regulation is too slo

I don't buy the regulation argument. Regulators will not have a sufficient understanding of the systems they are regulating, and of course regulation is too slow to react to a dynamic phenomenon. Perhaps more basic regulation stipulating liability if something goes wrong would be of use. I suggest we apply some lateral thinking to the underlying problem and approach it from another perspective entirely. Over the last 30 years or so, really since the end of the Cold War, high on idealism and technological utopianism, we've built a whole new high tech infrastructure to replace the low-tech infrastructure that preceded it. In so doing, we have invariably embraced technologies that we did not and do not understand, technologies that have never really been tested (as in been subjected to the test of time). Was this wise? Should we be using new, unproven technologies for security critical systems? These new systems have untold vulnerabilities, and their often centralised structure makes them very susceptible to disruptions. Should we not be building robust, decentralised, low tech solutions instead? Could something as fundamentally vulnerable as modern undersea cables have survived a cataclysm like the Second World War? I anticipate that any valuable data sitting on a networked device anywhere is at risk of eventually being lost, leaked, or stolen. Any networked safety critical system will be hacked or otherwise exploited (or fail catastrophically). It is only a matter of time. So much of modern (hybrid) warfare hinges on sowing discord, confusion, using disinformation and misinformation to cripple adversaries--and we have collectively built an infrastructure that is tailor made for this kind of disruption. What I mean is virtually everything that has come into being in the last 30 or so years, from complex global supply chains to modern banking. What that exists now would survive a SHTF scenario (not hard to imagine)? Again, we should be designing systems to be robust, decentralised, secure, and wherever possible, totally independent of high tech gadgetry. What use would 'identity theft' have been in the 1970s? Exactly.