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So, am I right in thinking that we have. 1. Theory X hypothesizes Q 2. Phenomenon Y models theory X 3. Phenomenon Y does not demonstrate Q Surel
by Lerc 8y ago
So, am I right in thinking that we have.
1. Theory X hypothesizes Q
2. Phenomenon Y models theory X
3. Phenomenon Y does not demonstrate Q
Surely there would be an insurmountable burden of proof on 2. Similarity does not mean identical. For any Y claiming to be the same as X, why can't it be rebutted with a "No it isn't" Proving that they are the same would be a different thing altogether but if as the article suggests X is not fully defined, it strikes me as impossible to prove. It just ends up in the not-falsifiable bin.
- dumbfoundded 8y agoThat's a fair observation. Though, I think the thought experiment to about the distance between the two slits as irrelevant to QM more concretely disproves the pilot wave theory. Most physicists when asked about QM will just say that this is a useful model to predict the outcomes of experiments. In fact the most successful model, ever. The magic that happens in the middle is currently untestable and thus uninteresting beyond philosophy. The problem with determinism is that it introduces more complexity to the model without improving any accuracy. Moreover, it doesn't help us predict the outcome of any experiments. Even if this experiment was successful, who cares? Does it change the math or predictions? Science works in a very simple way. We have evidence about how the universe works. We make models to explain that evidence. The models also make predictions about new evidence that we would expect to see. New evidence appears and either confirms or limits the domain of the model. Basically nothing but gravity has limited the domain of QM.
- naasking 8y ago> Though, I think the thought experiment to about the distance between the two slits as irrelevant to QM more concretely disproves the pilot wave theory. This sort of experiment does not disprove pilot waves. > Science works in a very simple way. We have evidence about how the universe works. We make models to explain that evidence. The models also make predictions about new evidence that we would expect to see. New evidence appears and either confirms or limits the domain of the model This is a very anemic view of the scientific process. Scientific theories have predictive and explanatory power. You described the process covering only the former, but the latter is critical for advancing theory. For instance, without Bohmian mechanics John Bell probably would never have developed Bell's Theorem and all the subsequent no-go theorems which have dramatically improved our understanding of quantum foundations. Theories that provide a mental framework for thinking about problems guide you in devising new experiments. Theories with no explanatory power provide no meaningful framework within which to devise new experiments.
- lmm 8y agoThe whole value of pilot wave theory was that it was an interpretation of QM in terms of things that behaved like ordinary macroscopic particles and waves. Given that ordinary particles and waves don't actually behave like that, there's absolutely no reason to prefer pilot wave theory over simpler, more direct interpretations of QM.
- naasking 8y agoI think your whole characterization of pilot theory's value and its relation to other interpretations is incorrect. Firstly, it's primary value is that it's an ontological interpretation, meaning it preserves realism where most other interpretations sacrifice realism. The motion of its beables has nothing to do with this. Secondly, pilot wave theory still requires the fewest number of assumptions, roughly on par with Many-Worlds, which means it's axiomatically simpler than other interpretations. Whatever you mean by "simpler", its not a form of simplicity that actually matters when gauging plausibility of a theory.
- lmm 8y agoI see many-worlds as a strict subset of pilot wave theory, since the pilot waves behave in exactly the same way as a many-worlds wavefunction. Adding a layer of particles-guided-by-the-waves on top of that is an extra complication that can only be justified (if at all) in terms of the intuitive appeal of their resemblance to macroscopic physics. (There's an argument of avoiding nonlocality/spooky-action-at-a-distance which I find specious: the particles are indeed localised but they don't actually play any significant role in determining behaviour. The pilot waves are doing all the work in the theory, and they have all the usual entanglement/interference/... behaviour (as they must, in order to be a correct theory of QM)).
- naasking 8y ago> Adding a layer of particles-guided-by-the-waves on top of that is an extra complication that can only be justified (if at all) in terms of the intuitive appeal of their resemblance to macroscopic physics. This "Bohmian mechanics is Many-Worlds in disguise" is simply false [1]. The axiomatic basis is completely different, and this is apparent because with Bohmian mechanics you can easily derive the Born rule, and as a result, it also makes a new prediction that isn't allowed in typical QM, quantum non-equilibrium [2]. Deriving the Born rule with MWI is a hotly debated open problem. [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/0811.0810 https://arxiv.org/abs/0811.0810 [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_non-equilibrium https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_non-equilibrium
- Svoka 8y agoonly benefit of "Pilot Waves" are that they're intuitive and "humane". This hypothesis doesn't make any falsifiable predictions so far, only has lots and lots of very complex math. It is mostly popular among people who want their physics to be visual and understandable to our scale intuition. With this it basically drops only thing which made it attractive.