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Sure, so here's an example. You've got this cert for api.example.com that's got "Symantec" branding on it. So it's issued by "Symantec Class 3 Secure Server CA
by tialaramex 8y ago
Sure, so here's an example. You've got this cert for api.example.com that's got "Symantec" branding on it.
So it's issued by "Symantec Class 3 Secure Server CA - G4"
and that cert chains back to a root named "VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3"
Well all that stuff is tainted so it's going away, right? Yup. But maybe your client checks for a pin to that "VeriSign Class 3 PPCA - G3" stuff so you need that!
DigiCert have your back, since it's being distrusted anyway there's no problem having their "DigiCert Transition Root G3" signed by that VeriSign root and that can issue its own Intermediate which they can keep online to sign for you.
So now the certificates aren't issued by the tainted Symantec systems, but your client trusts them.
They also have a bunch of brand new intermediates with the old branding, for cases where you need the branding to match (Yes, I know, that's cosmetic, but eh...) but the cryptography is all fresh.
You definitely should talk to DigiCert people about the specifics of anything you need, rather than take advice from random people on Hacker News like me, but for most scenarios they will either be able to advise you on how to transition safely to something that stays trusted in the Web PKI, or how to transition to something that's maintainable off the Web PKI.
The scenario they can't help with is if you need stuff directly (not via an intermediate) signed by old Symantec roots. That wasn't even supposed to be happening when Symantec existed, and in fact one of the smaller items taken into consideration when deciding to distrust Symantec was that they weren't able to resist plaintive cries (doubtless accompanied by hard cash) by banking customers who asked for this to be done even though it was forbidden.
- toast0 8y agoOh I see --- these are new intermediates that were allowed to be issued. That makes sense but feels wonky because these intermediates were signed after the announced distrusting. I didn't realize that browsers were going to be ok with the old CA(s) signing a couple more intermediates.
- kijin 8y agoI don't know the details of this specific situation, but it's possible to have two signatures on an intermediate CA. One by the old Symantec root, and the other by a trusted root. Up-to-date clients will ignore the Symantec chain and only follow the trusted chain. For example, Let's Encrypt maintains compatibility with old browsers by having IdenTrust (a widely trusted root) cross-sign their intermediate CAs.