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> We prioritize the safety of our users and recognize the additional risk caused by a delay in the implementation of the distrust plan. However, given the curre

> We prioritize the safety of our users and recognize the additional risk caused by a delay in the implementation of the distrust plan. However, given the current situation, we believe that delaying the release of this change until later this year when more sites have replaced their Symantec TLS certificates is in the overall best interest of our users. It would be nice if the sites were mentioned and contact information posted. It would be nicer if that information was mentioned directly to the end-user to encourage end-user action toward the site. And, is it not possible that the sites are fraudulent to begin with?

tialaramex 8y ago
It is conceivable but unlikely, if you mean in the sense that the certificates should not have been issued. The broad issue with Symantec was the lack of oversight delivered by its board and senior executives. People with the power to Make Shit Happen at Symantec either didn't know about, didn't care about, or actively permitted practices that were either forbidden, or which weren't specifically prohibited but a reasonable person should have known were unreasonable. This is not like DigiNotar, where we knew actual bad guys had either the keys or something morally equivalent to the keys (e.g. root passwords to issuance systems). It's not even like StartCom/ WoSign, where they were doing naughty things and trying to hide that so they wouldn't get discovered, but they fundamentally retained control of their systems, it's just that we didn't trust them. But nevertheless this could not be allowed to continue. Distrust was the mechanism by which it was made certain that it couldn't continue. However, Symantec decided to exit the business in 2017, and as a result their management practices are now largely irrelevant. In theory we could imagine some James Bond style villain copying their old root keys and, before they can be finally distrusted, using them to enact some ludicrous over-the-top plan. Stealing a trillion dollars? Starting a war between the US and Russia? Something like that. But this is not a James Bond movie, most likely everything proceeded as intended and the final distrust is merely a precaution.

tialaramex 8y ago

It is conceivable but unlikely, if you mean in the sense that the certificates should not have been issued. The broad issue with Symantec was the lack of oversight delivered by its board and senior executives. People with the power to Make Shit Happen at Symantec either didn't know about, didn't care about, or actively permitted practices that were either forbidden, or which weren't specifically prohibited but a reasonable person should have known were unreasonable. This is not like DigiNotar, where we knew actual bad guys had either the keys or something morally equivalent to the keys (e.g. root passwords to issuance systems). It's not even like StartCom/ WoSign, where they were doing naughty things and trying to hide that so they wouldn't get discovered, but they fundamentally retained control of their systems, it's just that we didn't trust them. But nevertheless this could not be allowed to continue. Distrust was the mechanism by which it was made certain that it couldn't continue. However, Symantec decided to exit the business in 2017, and as a result their management practices are now largely irrelevant. In theory we could imagine some James Bond style villain copying their old root keys and, before they can be finally distrusted, using them to enact some ludicrous over-the-top plan. Stealing a trillion dollars? Starting a war between the US and Russia? Something like that. But this is not a James Bond movie, most likely everything proceeded as intended and the final distrust is merely a precaution.