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"In order to appeal to other economists, behavioral economists are too often concerned with describing how human behavior deviates from the assumptions of stand
by mcguire 8y ago
"In order to appeal to other economists, behavioral economists are too often concerned with describing how human behavior deviates from the assumptions of standard economic models, rather than with understanding why people behave the way they do."
That is...actually, a good point, and exactly describes something I'd noticed.
One of the problems with economics is the assumption of the "perfectly rational actor", which sometimes leads to economic's descriptive vs. prescriptive issue: someone will create a massively complicated scheme that maximizes some positive value under a certain set of assumptions and then assume that people actually behave like that.
Some of what I've read, including by Richard Thaler, who I otherwise rather like, buys into that scenario, saying "no, this is what they do; they behave irrationally". Sure, people aren't by any means perfectly rational, but it's not irrational to not perform a complicated maneuver that's only useful in a specific, odd, circumstance.
There's another interesting bit from the article:
"[In the class mug experiment showing "loss aversion,"] the participants may not have had a clearly defined idea of what the mug was worth to them. If that was the case, there was a range of prices for the mug ($4 to $6) that left the participants disinclined to either buy or sell it, and therefore mug owners and non-owners maintained the status quo out of inertia. Only a relatively high price ($7 and up) offered a meaningful incentive for an owner to bother parting with the mug; correspondingly, only a relatively low price ($3 or below) offered a meaningful incentive for a non-owner to bother acquiring the mug.
"In experiments of our own, we were able to tease apart these two alternatives, and we found that the evidence was more consistent with the “inertia” explanation. Dr. Thaler has dismissed our argument as a “minor point about terminology,” since the deviant behaviors attributed to loss aversion occur regardless of the cause. But a different account for why a behavior occurs is not a minor terminological difference; it is a major explanatory difference. Only if we understand why a behavior occurs can we create generalizable knowledge, the goal of science."
"The deviant behaviors attributed to loss aversion?" Not only is there nothing deviant about the behavior, it's not in any sense "loss aversion". In fact, it's perfectly rational, given limited rationality resources, not to engage the whole engine in an otherwise minor scenario.