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> Had DNSSEC been deployed 5 years ago, Muammar Gaddafi would have controlled BIT.LY’s TLS keys. Um, he more or less did. Because he could have changes the A o
by amluto 8y ago
> Had DNSSEC been deployed 5 years ago, Muammar Gaddafi would have controlled BIT.LY’s TLS keys.
Um, he more or less did. Because he could have changes the A or CNAME records and gotten a DV certificate. And that certificate would have been legit, because bit.ly is genuinely subject to Libyan jurisdiction.
Sure, CT would have detected it. And any sane use of DANE (which might require an extension) would require CT plus DNSSEC. And, heck, DNSSEC would benefit greatly from a CT-like validation of domain signing keys.
None of this means that a failure to deploy DNSSEC is a good thing.
- tptacek 8y agoThis is a little like saying that it would have been fine if Libya had simply been granted a root CA loaded in everyone's trust stores; after all, CT would detect the bad certificates. The difference is, when a CA mis-issues, browsers can kill the CA, as they have done repeatedly in the last few years, to some of the biggest names in the business. You cannot do that do a TLD.
- amluto 8y agoNo, it’s a little bit like saying that Libya should be granted a root CA that is only accepted for .ly domains and only with appropriate CT records. Which actually seems quite reasonable to me. Edit: Libya could create a bitly-like service and serve it up at bit.ly right now. What exactly would stop them?
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]