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Is there any way to solve this problem without needing a "trusted manufacturer"? I know it won't probably won't apply to general purpose motherboards or device

Is there any way to solve this problem without needing a "trusted manufacturer"? I know it won't probably won't apply to general purpose motherboards or devices, but is there a way to design or build some components or devices in a way that you can verify that they can perform their purpose and nothing more? If we start with that concept, and slowly build up "verifiably secure" components, they can be the islands of security that we can build off of without having to worry if the manufacturing plant left their door open one day and some random person was able to sneak in.

nosuchthing 8y ago
What happens when your attacker knows how your safeguards work and can route around your door though the windows? For a motivated and well funded attacker who has an ability to manufacture a replacement chip with an additional coprocessor that can siphon or modify data from the main processors, network cards, and baseband modems, short of decapping every chip and component that comes through your assembly line your resources would be better spent on establishing trust mechanisms with your suppliers and the transportation couriers touching your devices before the end user acquires it. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tailored_Access_Operations#Known_targets_and_collaborations https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tailored_Access_Operations#Kno... http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969-3.html http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-power...
- Klathmon 8y ago
  My thought was it would be something that would get more secure the more knew about it, similar to math proofs or cryptography code. A way to verify a chip is working as expected in a way that it can't be gamed without breaking multiple fundamental proofs, so that you won't need to worry as much about who makes it, just that it "passes the tests". (and you'd probably need a system to validate the validators, but splitting up the people involved means it is significantly harder to hack multiple products to all have them falsely verify each other) Obviously I have no idea what I'm talking about and am just kind of musing at the idea, but trying to secure the whole supply chain from digging materials out of the ground all the way until it is in the hands of the consumer seems like an exercise in futility. You'll never be able to secure it in all cases, and like you said a truly motivated attacker is going to be able to break the chain (even if it means threatening a handful of people with death so you can get 5 minutes alone with a board).

nosuchthing 8y ago

What happens when your attacker knows how your safeguards work and can route around your door though the windows? For a motivated and well funded attacker who has an ability to manufacture a replacement chip with an additional coprocessor that can siphon or modify data from the main processors, network cards, and baseband modems, short of decapping every chip and component that comes through your assembly line your resources would be better spent on establishing trust mechanisms with your suppliers and the transportation couriers touching your devices before the end user acquires it. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tailored_Access_Operations#Known_targets_and_collaborations https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tailored_Access_Operations#Kno... http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969-3.html http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-power...

Klathmon 8y ago
My thought was it would be something that would get more secure the more knew about it, similar to math proofs or cryptography code. A way to verify a chip is working as expected in a way that it can't be gamed without breaking multiple fundamental proofs, so that you won't need to worry as much about who makes it, just that it "passes the tests". (and you'd probably need a system to validate the validators, but splitting up the people involved means it is significantly harder to hack multiple products to all have them falsely verify each other) Obviously I have no idea what I'm talking about and am just kind of musing at the idea, but trying to secure the whole supply chain from digging materials out of the ground all the way until it is in the hands of the consumer seems like an exercise in futility. You'll never be able to secure it in all cases, and like you said a truly motivated attacker is going to be able to break the chain (even if it means threatening a handful of people with death so you can get 5 minutes alone with a board).