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I have not read Tyler's original, but would like to dump some of my notes as I read through this. > I do deny the implication that philosophy should be judged
by hliyan 8y ago
I have not read Tyler's original, but would like to dump some of my notes as I read through this.
> I do deny the implication that philosophy should be judged by what gets exported from it—any more than physics or mathematics should be assessed in this mercenary and extrinsic way.
I find this strange. Shouldn't all knowledge be judged on the basis of whether their application yields valid results? If not, how should they be judged?
> I believe the turn away from schools, teachings and doctrines is itself one of the great instances of philosophical progress.
I agree. The existence of "schools" of thought (e.g. the Geocentric vs. Heliocentric schools of planetary motion) is a sign that the field of study is still nascent. Opinions should give way to theories as a science matures.
> It is not the point of philosophy to end philosophy, to ‘solve’ the deep questions so that people can stop thinking about them. It is the point of people to think about these questions, and the job of philosophers to rub their faces in that fact.
What? Yes, it is not the point of philosophy to end philosophy. But it's certainly not this either.
To me, the point of philosophy is to examine those aspects of existence that cannot be examined by other sciences, especially because the measurement or experimental methods or the resources to do so do not (yet) exist.
- TelmoMenezes 8y ago> To me, the point of philosophy is to examine those aspects of existence that cannot be examined by other sciences, especially because the measurement or experimental methods or the resources to do so do not (yet) exist. Not at all. Philosophy is about fundamental questions that fall outside the scope of the set of questions that can be settled by empirical validation. For example: "what is science?", "how can we know something?", "what does it mean for something to exist?", "why is there something rather than nothing?", "what is good and evil?", etc. One important branch of philosophy is that of epistemology, concerned with the nature and acquisition of knowledge itself. You expressed two rather extreme epistemological views (extreme in relation to the positions of most non-naive philosophers on these topics): -> That one can only judge knowledge on the basis of its applications; -> That given good enough instruments and enough resources, science could answer all questions worth being asked. Maybe the example questions above can convince you to think deeper about these positions.
- Koshkin 8y ago> "how can we know something?", "what does it mean for something to exist?", "why is there something rather than nothing?", "what is good and evil?" These all are perfectly valid questions, and they deserve answers which are based on rigorous science. Philosophical discourse is just the first step in trying to find these answers or to establish the scientific framework (a model) that would allow to discover them in a completely rational way.
- CM30 8y agoI strongly doubt we'll find scientific answers to moral questions anytime soon. The answer to 'what's right' likely doesn't exist in nature outside of human civilisation and social standards, and going from 'this is true' to 'this is right' is not an easy jump to make. (It's also one that would theoretically obsolete the field of politics if it was ever answered scientifically).
- Koshkin 8y agoThe answers to moral questions ("what is right") are found at the intersection of sociology, psychology, and biology - which are all very well established sciences.
- wsy 8y agoThey can't because they are empirical sciences. They only can find out facts about the world. Philosophy has already shown that moral is not derivable from facts: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem.
- Koshkin 8y agoTo be clear, I wasn't talking about creating "optimal" moral imperatives (which is impossible and even meaningless), only about finding out why they are the way they are in a particular social group, how they have evolved, etc.
- mannykannot 8y agoTyler Cowen's post is a short read, little more than a coattail-riding list of "breakthroughs in our philosophic understanding of the world" (and an idiosyncratic one at that: "12. Singapore..."?), with their attribution to philosophy justified with the platitude that anyone doing anything in these fields is doing philosophy. One question this approach raises, but does not answer, is whether the continued existence of academic philosophy as an independent discipline is justified, and that is the question Callard is attempting to address. In attempting to distance herself from Cowen's justification-by-significant-exports, Callard stresses internal measures of progress in philosophy, that inadvertently give the impression that the field is somewhat self-referential. Callard does better, I think, when she proposes an alternative "export" to those in Cowen's list: the habit of critical and disciplined thinking about real-world issues that are never going to be settled once and for all - predominantly in the realm of moral philosophy, I assume (I hope this is not a misrepresentation or trivialization of Callard's point.) The ancients' relevance is that they got the ball rolling, and each generation could do a lot worse than beginning its debate over these issues by following in their footsteps.