That was a paper reflecting on Paul Kargers compiler-compiler subversion he did in the 1970's evaluation of MULTICS. https://www.acsac.org/2002/papers/classic-

That was a paper reflecting on Paul Kargers compiler-compiler subversion he did in the 1970's evaluation of MULTICS. https://www.acsac.org/2002/papers/classic-multics.pdf https://www.acsac.org/2002/papers/classic-multics.pdf The seminal paper on subversion in the lifecycle was from another high-assurace, security researcher named Philip Myers in 1980: https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/conference-paper/1998/10/08/proceedings-of-the-21st-nissc-1998/documents/early-cs-papers/myer80.pdf https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/conference-pap... The recommendations were carefully specifying what things do, implementing them in a structured way to inspect for backdoors, using safe languages to block regular vulnerabilities, using covert-channel analysis to find leaks, verifying things down to object code or transistors, letting people build from crypto-signed source, and using couriers for the hardware from trusted facilities onshore ("trusted trucks"). People ignored most of that. Even Thompson as he was obsessed with unsafe language vs Wirth whose work let you choose per module. It's coming back to bite everyone.