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This horribly written series of articles should be titled "How technology could not prevent a hospital from giving a patient 38 times his dosage". - The system
by zamadatix 8y ago
This horribly written series of articles should be titled "How technology could not prevent a hospital from giving a patient 38 times his dosage".
- The system's dosage caps were disabled
- The dosage was never double checked since "technology is so accurate", ignoring people still make mistakes when using it
- Vast swaths of alerts are regularly ignored rather than fixed resulting in them being ignored
But more than anything already listed... the nurse didn't question giving someone 38 pills beyond "must be dilluted" yet the article pushes the focus to how technology led to the error? I just can't see how this title was chosen beyond clickbait considering it has statistics included showing how this system has been more reliable than the classic solution.
- fucking_tragedy 8y ago> But more than anything already listed... the nurse didn't question giving someone 38 pills beyond "must be dilluted" yet the article pushes the focus to how technology led to the error? The nurse did question it further. I feel as though the articles addressed this and your subsequent point pretty adequately. > Since the Paleolithic Era, we humans have concocted explanations for stuff we don’t quite understand: tides, seasons, gravity, death. The idea that the Septra might have been diluted was the first of many rationalizations that Levitt would formulate to explain the unusual dose and to justify her decision to administer it. At first glance it might seem crazy for her to have done so, but the decisions she made that night were entirely consistent with patterns of error seen in medicine and other complex industries. > What is new for medicine is the degree to which very expensive, state-of-the-art technology designed to prevent human mistakes not only helped give rise to the Septra error, but also failed to stop it, despite functioning exactly as it was programmed. > The human lapses that occurred after the computerized ordering system and pill-dispensing robots did their jobs perfectly well is a textbook case of English psychologist James Reason’s “Swiss cheese model” of error. Reason’s model holds that all complex organizations harbor many “latent errors,” unsafe conditions that are, in essence, mistakes waiting to happen. They’re like a forest carpeted with dry underbrush, just waiting for a match or a lightning strike. > Still, there are legions of errors every day in complex organizations that don’t lead to major accidents. Why? Reason found that these organizations have built-in protections that block glitches from causing nuclear meltdowns, or plane crashes, or train derailments. Unfortunately, all these protective layers have holes, which he likened to the holes in slices of Swiss cheese. > On most days, errors are caught in time, much as you remember to grab your house keys right before you lock yourself out. Those errors that evade the first layer of protection are caught by the second. Or the third. When a terrible “organizational accident” occurs — say, a space shuttle crash or a September 11–like intelligence breakdown — post hoc analysis virtually always reveals that the root cause was the failure of multiple layers, a grim yet perfect alignment of the holes in the metaphorical slices of Swiss cheese. Reason’s model reminds us that most errors are caused by good, competent people who are trying to do the right thing, and that bolstering the system — shrinking the holes in the Swiss cheese or adding overlapping layers — is generally far more productive than trying to purge the system of human error, an impossibility.
- Valmar 8y agoHmmmm. This assuages my annoyance, thankfully.
- zamadatix 8y agoI fail to see how the quote that she didn't question it beyond thinking it must be dilluted is an example of how she question giving someone 38 pills beyond "must be dilluted". Is any other line here actually relevant to technology or just how errors end up occurring even though you have resilient systems and checks built in? I.e. what about any of those has to do with technology itself?
- darpa_escapee 8y ago> I fail to see how the quote that she didn't question it beyond thinking it must be dilluted is an example of how she question giving someone 38 pills beyond "must be dilluted". From the above: > The idea that the Septra might have been diluted was the first of many rationalizations that Levitt would formulate to explain the unusual dose and to justify her decision to administer it. If you read the rest of the article, and not just what I've selected, there are multiple points in which the author quotes the nurse about her decision making process.
- zamadatix 8y agoI read all of the parts before making my first comment in the thread. I think you and I must disagree on what I meant by questioning the large dosage. I don't mean it as a thought exercise involving just the nurse trying to figure out why the dosage is so irregular rather the physical questioning process of validating the odd dosage with the assigning doctor before prescribing. I pointed it out not to say it's all the singular nurses fault but rather something glossed over in an article written against a technology system that had it's safeguards purposefully disabled. If anything the human error presented in the article is many times greater than technology error, reading the headline I expected the pill robot to have some error relating to batch size or some code error converting units wrong not a single confusing UI element as part of a string of overall hospital process and validation errors.
- skwb 8y agoThe point you may have failed to get is that hospitals rely on systems for catching errors (which is hard because medicine is super hard). The point Wachler attempts to raise is how when we blindly substitute technological systems with human based processes we can miss the mark if we're not extra careful. Very important as we think about replacing human effort with that of robots (think Tesla vs. Toyota in how they make cars...). I would also like to point out that simply fixing alerts isn't necessarily practical. When you're reliant on outside vendors for a highly regulated industry (requiring FDA approval of any and all changes), you can't exactly change on a dime. So while maybe we all in healthcare sneer at device manufactures, there's not a ton on the user side we can do.
- zamadatix 8y ago"The point Wachler attempts to raise is how when we blindly substitute technological systems with human based processes we can miss the mark if we're not extra careful." This isn't limited to us now using technological systems for steps. Unless you're arguing the portion of the article covering how the same errors used to happen more often before the system was put in place is incorrect. Fixing ALL false alerts is an impractical goal but lowering them to something reasonable to work with day to day is not. Epic is a complex system and a medical system but that doesn't mean every change involves you going to the government, a great deal of it can be customized with local Epic trained staff you were mandated to have when you bought the product. Doesn't make it easy but the majority of the problem is within the organization not the government or vendor. Anyway my overall disagreement with the article isn't that I think the technology is perfect rather it's written like it's worse than it was before because of the technology when it even admits things are better than before because of the technology. It did little to convince me technology led a hospital to do anything vs the same problems the hospital has always had with it's verification procedures.
- skwb 8y agoI think the main points of the article is to introduce the potential complexities and pitfalls that come along with the digitization of clinical records and workflows. In my personal experience, engineers that haven't worked within a clinical setting always tend to struggle with how complex healthcare actually is, and that it requires a ton of nuance for understanding how to successfully develop digital clinical tools. The other concern is that unlike Google, FB, or Uber, tech is not the funding priority of a healthcare system. They do spend money on large contracts for fully fledged EHR system (and a bunch of add ons), but because fundamentally it's an infrastructure problem and IT for healthcare systems are cost center, they're never going to be able to replicate the techno-centric workforce. I say this as someone who is intimately involved in developing technology for the healthcare system. But you do what you can; clinical informaticists (which is developing as it's own sub-specality) try to reduce the load, and do take on the continuous development of EHR systems. Asking for a level of polish that is unachievable isn't going to promote optimism.