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So the point of the attack was to subvert the BMC firmware in a way that was resistant to firmware re-flashing, but not resistant to firmware integrity checks.
by dboreham 8y ago
So the point of the attack was to subvert the BMC firmware in a way that was resistant to firmware re-flashing, but not resistant to firmware integrity checks. But there are no firmware integrity checks?
- baybal2 8y agoWhat is likely: they connected their own flash in place of recovery flash, that was not soldered on on that particular board version, that for what that soic8 or tsop8 pad is on photos; the chip will boot from the recovery, but if someone were to read the main flash, it would output the correct content. Only if somebody specifically poked the recovery, would the bug be revealed.
- parliament32 8y agoWhy would an integrity check show you anything different? It's all the same code running on the actual BMC, it'd be identical. That's the entire point of having an external package do all the malicious stuff -- reflash/dump/check will come up clean every time.