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Heh. One colleague has "Hope is not a valid deployment strategy" as a signature. Most places might be blocking this type of activity by default. For most of ou
by ytjohn 8y ago
Heh. One colleague has "Hope is not a valid deployment strategy" as a signature.
Most places might be blocking this type of activity by default. For most of our security audits, it's just assumed that the SM IPMI or Dell idrac is vulnerable to one exploit or another. We mitigate that by controlling the traffic. I feel this is common practice in most places that understand vlans and firewalls.
However, while blocking is easy, being aware of something like this is on another level altogether. Unicorn jumping over a rainbow level rare. You really have to be logging outbound attempts and dns lookups. Where I work, there is a full security team and they are at an insane level where they log the allowed traffic. One told me that the allowed traffic is more interesting than the denied traffic. Denied just tells them what we anticipated, while active helps them establish a pattern and look for deviations.
- dvfjsdhgfv 8y agoThat's my point. Security people were analyzing network traffic for decades trying to spot something that doesn't fit, host-wise, pattern-wise or even packet-wise (see The Museum of Broken Packets[0], for example). And someone managed to somehow hide all this traffic from security experts working for Amazon and Apple, for months or years? I'm very curious to see how. [0] http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/mobp/ http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/mobp/
- fulafel 8y agoI think you misread - "Unicorn jumping over a rainbow level rare" was about catching it, not missing it.