6 ms·
What is the purpose of rolling over the key, if the new key is simply signed by the old one? Meaning it has exactly as much security as the old key did. I can
by ars 8y ago
What is the purpose of rolling over the key, if the new key is simply signed by the old one? Meaning it has exactly as much security as the old key did.
I can understand it if the new key was a different algorithm, or key-length or something. But what is the purpose in simply picking a new key?
- lmm 8y agoThe old one will presumably eventually be expired. That means someone who compromised the old one can't hang onto their access indefinitely.
- benchaney 8y agoYes. To add to this, in order for an attacker in this situation to maintain their access, they would have to perform a very visible active attack. If not for this they would be able to maintain their access passively.
- the_clarence 8y agoIf someone compromised the old one, it would be already catastrophic. Key rotations are mostly about compliance requirements and are also mostly rubbish.
- tedunangst 8y agoIf the old key has been unknowingly compromised, it is now replaced. The new key is not "simply" signed by the old one. You have to announce it for 30 days, making it harder to pull of a surreptitious switch.
- tialaramex 8y agoThe new key is simply newer. For especially valuable keys we must assume that an adversary is trying to break them, even if this will be difficult and expensive. But by changing keys, we undo all the work invested so far into breaking a key, since the key they were breaking won't even be used any more. This was the rationale behind password change frequency rules too. If I can try 100 passwords per day, and I'm sure you've picked 1 of 1000000 passwords I have a good chance to find which one in a few years. But if you're forced to change it every 6 months then I'll never have more than a small chance to get it. Suppose it takes a government agency 25 years to break a key, and you replace keys every 10 years. So they start on key A in year zero, in year 10 you switch to key B, in year 20 to key C, and then in year 25 they've broken A - but who cares everybody is using C now. You might think well they could start working on C from the outset. No. The keys are not chosen long in advance, you can't break C until it has been chosen.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- RL_Quine 8y ago> This was the rationale behind password change frequency rules too. If I can try 100 passwords per day, and I'm sure you've picked 1 of 1000000 passwords I have a good chance to find which one in a few years. But if you're forced to change it every 6 months then I'll never have more than a small chance to get it. This is not how probability works. Password rotation is intended to prevent long term compromises from existing due to a leaked password. I'd debate if this actually has any effect, but that's another matter entirely.
- peterwwillis 8y ago> if this actually has any effect It has the effect of limiting the amount of time that a credential leak can lead to exploit. The focus is on long-term undiscovered compromise using valid credentials. If an attack is not discovered, and the credentials are never changed, the attacker might have access for years. If you're worried about something like corporate espionage, this mitigation is simple and minimal effort. For really sensitive credentials, I would shrink the rotation period even more. The more often you're forced to do it, the more likely the process will become smoother.
- RL_Quine 8y agoI argue that most compromises are effectively instantaneous. There’s usually little value in being a persistent threat when it takes only a moment to, for example, dump a database or an IMAP folder. Forcing rapid rotations just encourages people to choose weak passwords or store them on post it notes on their screen.
- snowwrestler 8y agoAnd groups that value persistence (like APTs) rarely depend on passwords to provide it. Instead they map the environment and find a local vulnerability to exploit and create a place to hang out. One of my employers had the Chinese in their networks for years. We all dutifully changed our passwords every 90 days and it made no difference at all to the Chinese persistence.
- twic 8y agoSome villain might have got a copy of the old key. They won't necessarily have a copy of the new key.
- mappu 8y agoThe old key was hosted inside a proprietary appliance and can't be extracted. https://labs.ripe.net/Members/anandb/the-future-of-dnssec-at-the-ripe-ncc https://labs.ripe.net/Members/anandb/the-future-of-dnssec-at... https://labs.ripe.net/Members/anandb/dnssec-signer-migration https://labs.ripe.net/Members/anandb/dnssec-signer-migration """Our old Secure64 signers do not export their private keys. This means that in order to migrate to the new signers, we will have to perform a KSK roll-over."""
- pauldino 8y agoI'm pretty sure that's unrelated to the DNSSEC root key which is managed by IANA and not RIPE NCC. https://www.iana.org/dnssec https://www.iana.org/dnssec I'm guessing that's referring to signing the reverse DNS zones for their IP address allocations (193.in-addr.arpa for example) and it's just coincidentally timed with the DNSSEC root key rollover.
- pilif 8y agoIsn’t that a good thing? You don’t want to be able to export keys from a HSM.
- the_clarence 8y agoMostly security theater, but it’s still useful to practice a key rollover in case something bad happens.