"In the three years since the briefing in McLean, no commercially viable way to detect attacks like the one on Supermicro’s motherboards has emerged—or has look

"In the three years since the briefing in McLean, no commercially viable way to detect attacks like the one on Supermicro’s motherboards has emerged—or has looked likely to emerge." I know a commercially viable way to detect hardware attacks. Standardized hardware designs, such as the "x86 standard," ARM IP licenses, and more recently, RISC-V, decentralizes manufacturing and drives the cost to commodity levels. I'm specifically proposing that the U.S. Government appropriate the patents on whichever hardware design and declare them a National Security asset, and then guarantee royalty-free licenses to any company that wants to use them. When it's no longer a big profit center, China is no longer as interested in owning a monopoly on it. And presto: there's no longer a monopoly on the hardware. Thus it's no longer a guarantee that your hardware is being bent to the will of a single nation-state. Hardware attacks can be detected as variations between the hardware made by one nation vs. the hardware made by another nation. The downside is that Apple can't have the same profit margins that come from closed, proprietary hardware. The upside is that manufacturing and process innovation (such as Intel used to do) becomes extremely desirable. It becomes so valuable that we saw Intel reluctant to offshore their best processes. There: economic solution and political points, to boot!