I'm intrigued. I'll have to read the book. For me, the distinction between it's raining and whether I believe it is raining rests on the distinction between exp

I'm intrigued. I'll have to read the book. For me, the distinction between it's raining and whether I believe it is raining rests on the distinction between experience and concepts. (This doesn't appear to be the Kimhi's thesis, if I understood the NYT article.) I first read about this studying Buddhism. I know it is raining when I experience the sensation of rain. The truth of my experience can't be disputed. My experience may even be illusory, but it's still my experience. "I heard the sound of rain in my dream." On the other hand, a belief ("it is raining", "there are no black swans") depends on conceptual thinking, which is instantly invalidated by a counterexample or discovery of a logical error. Beliefs are useful, but must be held lightly, subject to experience.