The issue is related to the distinction between the meaning of statements, and what one can say about an individual who utters them. There is no logical contra

The issue is related to the distinction between the meaning of statements, and what one can say about an individual who utters them. There is no logical contradiction in "it's raining but I don't believe it". That describes a genuine state the world can be in. There's clearly something going wrong if someone says that, but it somehow depends on who's speaking. In the third person, it's fine, in the first person, it's a problem. In contrast, "it's raining and it isn't", or "Justin believes that it's raining and he doesn't" are just contradictions, no matter who says them. The challenge is to characterize what is wrong with the Moorean absurdity. At least, that's the core of the traditional story, which Kimhi wants to reject. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore%27s_paradox https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore%27s_paradox https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemic-paradoxes/#MooPro https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemic-paradoxes/#MooP... P.S. Your point about floating a possibility is addressed in the SEP article I linked. In general, contemporary philosophers will talk about a sentence like "It's raining" as an assertion, and include explicit clarification when it's not an assertion ("it might be raining", "it's raining?", "if it's raining and I don't believe it, then I'm wrong").