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In both cases, the language you are using does not describe what you really mean. In the first instance: "I am experiencing a hallucination of rain, but it is n

In both cases, the language you are using does not describe what you really mean. In the first instance: "I am experiencing a hallucination of rain, but it is not raining". In the second "The fictional character Santa Claus is said to live at the north pole. I do not believe Santa Claus is real". In both instances, precision prevents you from conflating two classes of belief. From your own perspective, it is quite impossible to state "I believe it is raining. It is not raining." This all seems to hinge on the issue of perspective. Very interesting stuff. Grateful to the "Herodotus38" for explaining it; I couldn't grok it from the article. I wonder if someone could extend this to put mathematical proofs in applied maths on a better footing.

_emacsomancer_ 8y ago
> In both cases, the language you are using does not describe what you really mean. In the first instance: "I am experiencing a hallucination of rain, but it is not raining". In the second "The fictional character Santa Claus is said to live at the north pole. I do not believe Santa Claus is real". That's not the case. Your sentences are not my intended readings. My original is perfectly expressible in (intensional) predicate logic: (Rain(w,t) ∧ ¬Rain(w',t)) (where w,w' are worlds, t is a time) The conflation of psychology and logic makes no sense to me.
- bencollier49 8y ago
  But what the philosopher is stating, I think, is that no-one can state: (Rain(w,t) ∧ ¬Rain(w',t)) because no-one has the standing or perspective to be able to verify Rain(w,t) and ¬Rain(w',t) simultaneously. Essentially: w -> ¬w' Is this attempting to strip objectivity from philosophy?
  - _emacsomancer_ 8y ago
    > w -> ¬w' That doesn't work, because I can say something like "John dreamt he found a unicorn" which involves two different worlds (say, w & w'). Or, to make it more parallel, "John dreamt he wasn't dreaming". Which are both perfectly reasonable sentences and have perfectly reasonable predicate logic translations.
    - bencollier49 8y ago
      In the original, we are not proposing separate worlds though, not in that sense. 1. I assert that it is not raining. 2. It is not raining. This chap saying that 1 and 2 exist in the same world, and are therefore contradictory. Equivalence of statement and assertion.
      - _emacsomancer_ 8y ago
        It makes no sense to me to conflate logical statements and (human) speaker-anchored assertions. When semanticists work on natural language meaning, this requires use of the formal languages. It makes no sense to me to hard-wire human-speakers into a system of abstract logic (which we need when we reason about human speakers).
    - Firadeoclus 8y ago
      In "John dreamt he wasn't dreaming" the two observations either have different observers or happen at different times. At no point is John both aware that he is dreaming and also thinking that he is not dreaming.
orteam 8y ago
It seems from the comments that people are trying to find an easy way out from the dilemma - like supposing 2 different 'I's or the same 'I' that partakes in 2 different worlds/realities. The reading that I like better is this: given the same frame of reference (same 'I', same reality) to both parts of the sentence, does it represent a logical fallacy?

_emacsomancer_ 8y ago

> In both cases, the language you are using does not describe what you really mean. In the first instance: "I am experiencing a hallucination of rain, but it is not raining". In the second "The fictional character Santa Claus is said to live at the north pole. I do not believe Santa Claus is real". That's not the case. Your sentences are not my intended readings. My original is perfectly expressible in (intensional) predicate logic: (Rain(w,t) ∧ ¬Rain(w',t)) (where w,w' are worlds, t is a time) The conflation of psychology and logic makes no sense to me.

bencollier49 8y ago
But what the philosopher is stating, I think, is that no-one can state: (Rain(w,t) ∧ ¬Rain(w',t)) because no-one has the standing or perspective to be able to verify Rain(w,t) and ¬Rain(w',t) simultaneously. Essentially: w -> ¬w' Is this attempting to strip objectivity from philosophy?
- _emacsomancer_ 8y ago
  > w -> ¬w' That doesn't work, because I can say something like "John dreamt he found a unicorn" which involves two different worlds (say, w & w'). Or, to make it more parallel, "John dreamt he wasn't dreaming". Which are both perfectly reasonable sentences and have perfectly reasonable predicate logic translations.
  - bencollier49 8y ago
    In the original, we are not proposing separate worlds though, not in that sense. 1. I assert that it is not raining. 2. It is not raining. This chap saying that 1 and 2 exist in the same world, and are therefore contradictory. Equivalence of statement and assertion.
    - _emacsomancer_ 8y ago
      It makes no sense to me to conflate logical statements and (human) speaker-anchored assertions. When semanticists work on natural language meaning, this requires use of the formal languages. It makes no sense to me to hard-wire human-speakers into a system of abstract logic (which we need when we reason about human speakers).
  - Firadeoclus 8y ago
    In "John dreamt he wasn't dreaming" the two observations either have different observers or happen at different times. At no point is John both aware that he is dreaming and also thinking that he is not dreaming.

orteam 8y ago

It seems from the comments that people are trying to find an easy way out from the dilemma - like supposing 2 different 'I's or the same 'I' that partakes in 2 different worlds/realities. The reading that I like better is this: given the same frame of reference (same 'I', same reality) to both parts of the sentence, does it represent a logical fallacy?