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Yes And GEB's explanation of it is more complete/exact than the one in the article. It is also amazingly mind-twisting. Not the explanation per se, but the th
by raverbashing 8y ago
Yes
And GEB's explanation of it is more complete/exact than the one in the article.
It is also amazingly mind-twisting. Not the explanation per se, but the theorem.
And I think its consequences are under appreciated: no (sufficiently complex) logical system is free from self-contradictions.
- wk_end 8y agoI believe that's a misinterpretation of Goedel; it's an incompleteness theorem, not an unsoundness theorem. Incompleteness: there exist true statements that lack proofs Unsoundness: there exist false statements with proofs If I understand all this correctly, what Goedel demonstrated was that a sufficiently complex logical system could self-reference, and from self-reference unprovable (not contradictory) true statements fall out. By reductio ad absurdum any self-contradictory logical system is useless as a logic because everything is provable in it, so one wonders if such systems should even be considered "logical systems".
- raverbashing 8y agoThe inconsistency part is the 2nd incompleteness theory. You don't RAA it because you can't prove the system is consistent (because you can't prove the counterexample)
- wk_end 8y ago"Gödel's second incompleteness theorem states no consistent axiomatic system which includes Peano arithmetic can prove its own consistency. Stated more colloquially, any formal system that is interesting enough to formulate its own consistency can prove its own consistency iff it is inconsistent." [1] I believe your position is that "sufficiently complex" == "able to formulate and prove its own consistency"; my position is that such a system would be worthless as a logic, because in such a system you can prove anything. Your second paragraph is inscrutable to me. Are you trying to claim that you can't prove everything with a known inconsistent logic? Are you referring to paraconsistent logics? [1] http://mathworld.wolfram.com/GoedelsSecondIncompletenessTheorem.html http://mathworld.wolfram.com/GoedelsSecondIncompletenessTheo...
- raverbashing 8y ago> "sufficiently complex" Meaning, not "trivially simple". The description in your link is good enough, the description in the Wikipedia is more detailed > any formal system that is interesting enough to formulate its own consistency can prove its own consistency iff it is inconsistent. That's what "sufficiently complex" means and why you can't Reduction Ad Absurdum it.
- edanm 8y ago> And I think its consequences are under appreciated: no (sufficiently complex) logical system is free from self-contradictions. That doesn't seem right? Any logical system that has a self-contradiction (which I take to mean can prove a statement and its inverse) will be able to prove everything, which is obviously a pretty big flaw. What Godel's 2nd incompleteness theorem says is that if a system can prove its own consistency, then it follows that it is unsound.
- carlehewitt 8y agoThe Dedekind/Peano higher order theory of the natural numbers prove its own formal consistency. In this theory, proof checking is computationally decidable even though the theorems are not computationally enumerable by a total procedure.
- wk_end 8y ago> The Dedekind/Peano higher order theory of the natural numbers prove its own formal consistency. No it doesn't - that would contradict Goedel's well-established theorem. The formal consistency of Peano arithmetic has been proven, but not by Peano arithmetic: > Gentzen's theory obtained by adding quantifier-free transfinite induction to primitive recursive arithmetic proves the consistency of first-order Peano arithmetic (PA) but does not contain PA [...] Gentzen's theory is not contained in PA, either, however, since it can prove a number-theoretical fact—the consistency of PA—that PA cannot. [1] [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gentzen%27s_consistency_proof#Relation_to_Hilbert's_program_and_G%C3%B6del's_theorem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gentzen%27s_consistency_proof#...
- carlehewitt 8y agoGodel's results are for the 1st order variant of the Dedekind/Peano theory of the natural numbers. Consequently, there is no contradiction with the inferential completeness (every proposition is provable or disprovable) or self-provability of formal consistency in the higher order theory. Also, Godel's proposition "I'mUnprovable" does not exist in the higher order theory because it doesn't type check. See https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01566393 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01566393