> I won't argue that some phenomena may be resistant to reduction beyond human capability to reduce. My main problem with the thesis is that whatever irreducibl

> I won't argue that some phenomena may be resistant to reduction beyond human capability to reduce. My main problem with the thesis is that whatever irreducible phenomena that is, is still part of the natural, physical world. You don't have to posit the supernatural. People conflate believing in a single objective reality with having to believe in strong materialism (or worse, atomic materialism, when QM goes deeper), when all you have to do is believe that reality is consistent. You might not be able to create a total consistent model of reality, but if reality is consistent then you don't have to propose extra-physical forces due to conservation of energy or other such constraints. You can exclude contradictory hypotheses even if you can't settle on the "actual" one, even in-principle. In which case you can have models in one domain of science, and models in another domain, which may not connect with each other, but they don't have to contradict each other either, and you can do this all while not believing in the supernatural or denying an objective reality.