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Isn't this 'the argument of personal incredulity'? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divine_fallacy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divine_fallacy > I cannot imagine

by rusanu 8y ago

Isn't this 'the argument of personal incredulity'? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divine_fallacy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divine_fallacy > I cannot imagine how P could be true; therefore P must be false.

13415 8y ago
No, it's an inference to the best explanation where for various reason it is thought that physics does not offer the best explanation. If the physical explanation is not even sufficient, then it cannot be the best explanation. That's the gist of the argument. Of course, there is disagreement about what counts as a sufficient explanation or the best explanation at a time and others may disagree. It's philosophy of science, not science.
goatlover 8y ago
No, the argument is that we can't see how P could be true, even though plenty of people assume that P is true. But P could also be false. It's questioning the assumption that P is true because nobody has succeeded so far in showing that it is. It might or might not be. We don't know.
- sofal 8y ago
  Are you talking about the argument outlined in the article? I don't see where you're getting that from. The article in the OP is about the argument that the explanation of characteristic biological functions by physics is impossible. Niel argues for epistemological anti-reductionism. It's not about throwing doubt on the assumption that reductionism is true, it is specifically arguing that it is in fact false using the analogy of the complementarity that governs the explanation of the stability of atoms.
  - goatlover 8y ago
    More so a response to the parent that the article in the OP was an argument from incredulity. Still not convinced that arguing for impossibility is the same as arguing form incredulity, if you have a good argument for impossibility. So for example, Chalmers arguing that consciousness can't be reduced to physics is not an argument from incredulity. Rather, it's an argument that it's conceptually impossible. People might disagree with either Bohr or Chalmers arguments, but that's different from them committing this particular fallacy, unless it can be pointed out how Bohr or Chalmers were arguing from a failure of imagination.
    - simonh 8y ago
      Ok, I’ll try to point that out. Charmers argues that quaila cannot be reduced to physical causes. However we know for sure that any conceivable information or process that can be performed on information must be tractable to physical encoding. It seems to me that qualia are simply information, or a process performed on information. If so, clearly they can have a physical cause. To refute this, Chalmers would have to show some property or characteristic of qualia that is not information or a process performed on it. But this is impossible. Any such explanation would by definition have to be encoded in information or a process performed on information. Therefore if it is even possible for Chalmers to explain or adequately describe his thesis in a complete and consistent way, it must be true that his thesis is false.
      - goatlover 8y ago
        > It seems to me that qualia are simply information, or a process performed on information. Not all information has a subjective component to it, so qualia can't be identical to information, unless one is a panpsychist. Moreover, information can be seen as an abstraction from experience that humans create via cognition and language. One might respond that all physical processes involve information, but physics is itself an abstraction. It's our attempt to create a map or models of the world. It's not the world itself.
        simonh 8y ago
        >Not all information has a subjective component to it, so qualia can't be identical to information, unless one is a panpsychist. Doesn't that just make qualia a subset of information, not distinct from it? Even metadata is still just a form of data.
      - coldtea 8y ago
        >Charmers argues that quaila cannot be reduced to physical causes. However we know for sure that any conceivable information or process that can be performed on information must be tractable to physical encoding. That's taking what you ought to prove for granted. We hardly know it "for sure". Even if we're totally certain of it, he haven't proved it.

by rusanu 8y ago

13415 8y ago

No, it's an inference to the best explanation where for various reason it is thought that physics does not offer the best explanation. If the physical explanation is not even sufficient, then it cannot be the best explanation. That's the gist of the argument. Of course, there is disagreement about what counts as a sufficient explanation or the best explanation at a time and others may disagree. It's philosophy of science, not science.

goatlover 8y ago

No, the argument is that we can't see how P could be true, even though plenty of people assume that P is true. But P could also be false. It's questioning the assumption that P is true because nobody has succeeded so far in showing that it is. It might or might not be. We don't know.

sofal 8y ago
Are you talking about the argument outlined in the article? I don't see where you're getting that from. The article in the OP is about the argument that the explanation of characteristic biological functions by physics is impossible. Niel argues for epistemological anti-reductionism. It's not about throwing doubt on the assumption that reductionism is true, it is specifically arguing that it is in fact false using the analogy of the complementarity that governs the explanation of the stability of atoms.
- goatlover 8y ago
  More so a response to the parent that the article in the OP was an argument from incredulity. Still not convinced that arguing for impossibility is the same as arguing form incredulity, if you have a good argument for impossibility. So for example, Chalmers arguing that consciousness can't be reduced to physics is not an argument from incredulity. Rather, it's an argument that it's conceptually impossible. People might disagree with either Bohr or Chalmers arguments, but that's different from them committing this particular fallacy, unless it can be pointed out how Bohr or Chalmers were arguing from a failure of imagination.
  - simonh 8y ago
    Ok, I’ll try to point that out. Charmers argues that quaila cannot be reduced to physical causes. However we know for sure that any conceivable information or process that can be performed on information must be tractable to physical encoding. It seems to me that qualia are simply information, or a process performed on information. If so, clearly they can have a physical cause. To refute this, Chalmers would have to show some property or characteristic of qualia that is not information or a process performed on it. But this is impossible. Any such explanation would by definition have to be encoded in information or a process performed on information. Therefore if it is even possible for Chalmers to explain or adequately describe his thesis in a complete and consistent way, it must be true that his thesis is false.
    - goatlover 8y ago
      > It seems to me that qualia are simply information, or a process performed on information. Not all information has a subjective component to it, so qualia can't be identical to information, unless one is a panpsychist. Moreover, information can be seen as an abstraction from experience that humans create via cognition and language. One might respond that all physical processes involve information, but physics is itself an abstraction. It's our attempt to create a map or models of the world. It's not the world itself.
      - simonh 8y ago
        >Not all information has a subjective component to it, so qualia can't be identical to information, unless one is a panpsychist. Doesn't that just make qualia a subset of information, not distinct from it? Even metadata is still just a form of data.
    - coldtea 8y ago
      >Charmers argues that quaila cannot be reduced to physical causes. However we know for sure that any conceivable information or process that can be performed on information must be tractable to physical encoding. That's taking what you ought to prove for granted. We hardly know it "for sure". Even if we're totally certain of it, he haven't proved it.