> I think that, from a utilitarian perspective, the only mail servers that matter are the ones that Google and its peers run, and that's the threat model I care

> I think that, from a utilitarian perspective, the only mail servers that matter are the ones that Google and its peers run, and that's the threat model I care about. I'd be surprised if Google doesn't already enforce TLS for other big peers like Microsoft. In your universe, what do we need a broken standard for? > you require the radical centralization of all cryptographic trust on the Internet into a tree-shaped PKI Web PKI isn't radically centralized? It's worse than radically centralized, because you can break Web PKI by attacking the weakest CA. > it drives a stake through the heart of the last truly motivating problem that DNSSEC was going to solve. MTA-STS may give people cover to pretend they don't need DNSSEC. But make no mistake: it doesn't actually solve the problem. It's interesting that technical opinions of DNSSEC have devolved into such irrational hatred that people will openly proclaim that fake security is better than actual, DNSSEC-provided security. Yes, DNSSEC is complex. Yes, it has issues with network privacy. But those arguments don't redeem MTA-STS, which is fundamentally broken.