4 ms·

I struggle to believe that it took over 30 minutes to get this thing back down after the incident If your inferring that a 30 minute offset was introduce

I struggle to believe that it took over 30 minutes to get this thing back down after the incident If your inferring that a 30 minute offset was introduced, in order to dump the stale audio buffer, before permitting access to the CVR instrument on the ground, I'd offer the idea that there were 4 other planes on the taxiway, waiting to take off, and that the intervening 30 minutes could be eaten up by letting those planes depart, based on an array of other factors. A concerted effort to dump the recorder buffer would require the participation of more than just the flight crew, since it manipulates the standing traffic pattern. Not an impossibility, and we know that in-group "walls of silence" definitely accumulate in high-intensity industries, but the air traffic control audio suggests a really minor transgression of situational awareness, even if the circumstances are assuredly unforgiving ones. In the radio audio, the pilot clearly states that he's noticing lights on what he imagines to be his runway, and asks for confirmation as to what they might be. The tower reaffirms that he's all clear. Only then does a pilot from one of the planes on the ground speak up, and complain. At that moment, both ATC and the plane realize the error. It's arguable that the pilot anticipated a likely go-around, based on intuition that the lights he was observing were definitely other planes, and that what appears to be an extremely close call proves it's own margin of error as reasonable, given that the participants recovered from the error.

tialaramex 8y ago
No, I'm _implying_ that I don't believe it took 30 minutes to get down. Based on the abstract I would say you're going to find out it came back down in under 30 minutes, and then "oops" they let the CVR be re-used, overwriting the recording anyway. The text from the linked abstract says: "Cockpit voice recorder (CVR) information was not available for this incident because the data were overwritten before senior Air Canada officials became aware of the severity of this incident" One of the nice things about working in the Web PKI is that this crap doesn't get you anywhere since keeping records is one of the requirements, and any time the options are "This issuer might be crooked or they might be incompetent" both are disqualifiying anyway, no need to figure out which it is to make a determination. It lets me sleep easier, were people at Symantec reckless, or were they so greedy that they actively tolerated fraud? Don't care, not my problem now, let their shareholders worry about it.
- deleted 8y ago
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- cpitVoxRec 8y ago
  Oh, I don't know about these particular ideas you're chasing. There are quite a number of independent, redundant resources that would be very difficult to align forgeries across and present as fraudulent data, worldwide, for weeks, months, and even years after the incident. It just sounds like a fishing expedition for some kind of cover up that exploits an incredibly narrow gap, covered by a myriad of alternative information sources that are more than capable of sealing up an air tight sequence of events by other means. Open, consumer information sources like flightaware.com alone had the answer to the questions you're asking, long ago. The radar history for this event was paywalled here for days after the event: https://flightaware.com/live/flight/ACA759/history https://flightaware.com/live/flight/ACA759/history The open, freebie log only gives like two weeks of charts, but the data you mention was lying around, available for like 8 months, to anyone with premium access to that particular service. And anyway, I'm sure it's just a convenience wrapper to public data that's still floating around to anyone willing to dig. Here's another service, if you've got $500 bucks, and really would like to know right now: https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/ac759/ https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/ac759/ And to reiterate, this is only costing money today on account of being late to the party. Multiple systems surfaced this data to the world in real time, and openly back-logged for months after. I'd bet good money a wide audience fact checked exactly what you've suggested a long time ago (even here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14741605 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14741605). But my opinion isn't very important when the information is available in a general sense, to anyone who really wants it, even now, more than a year later. Feel free to be suspicious about these resources being far downstream and non-official consumer products, but if that doesn't suffice, then other (much, much bigger) doubts occlude any potentially satisfactory assessment which won't get solved in a random thread by amateur internet detectives like us.

tialaramex 8y ago

No, I'm _implying_ that I don't believe it took 30 minutes to get down. Based on the abstract I would say you're going to find out it came back down in under 30 minutes, and then "oops" they let the CVR be re-used, overwriting the recording anyway. The text from the linked abstract says: "Cockpit voice recorder (CVR) information was not available for this incident because the data were overwritten before senior Air Canada officials became aware of the severity of this incident" One of the nice things about working in the Web PKI is that this crap doesn't get you anywhere since keeping records is one of the requirements, and any time the options are "This issuer might be crooked or they might be incompetent" both are disqualifiying anyway, no need to figure out which it is to make a determination. It lets me sleep easier, were people at Symantec reckless, or were they so greedy that they actively tolerated fraud? Don't care, not my problem now, let their shareholders worry about it.

deleted 8y ago
[deleted]
cpitVoxRec 8y ago
Oh, I don't know about these particular ideas you're chasing. There are quite a number of independent, redundant resources that would be very difficult to align forgeries across and present as fraudulent data, worldwide, for weeks, months, and even years after the incident. It just sounds like a fishing expedition for some kind of cover up that exploits an incredibly narrow gap, covered by a myriad of alternative information sources that are more than capable of sealing up an air tight sequence of events by other means. Open, consumer information sources like flightaware.com alone had the answer to the questions you're asking, long ago. The radar history for this event was paywalled here for days after the event: https://flightaware.com/live/flight/ACA759/history https://flightaware.com/live/flight/ACA759/history The open, freebie log only gives like two weeks of charts, but the data you mention was lying around, available for like 8 months, to anyone with premium access to that particular service. And anyway, I'm sure it's just a convenience wrapper to public data that's still floating around to anyone willing to dig. Here's another service, if you've got $500 bucks, and really would like to know right now: https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/ac759/ https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/ac759/ And to reiterate, this is only costing money today on account of being late to the party. Multiple systems surfaced this data to the world in real time, and openly back-logged for months after. I'd bet good money a wide audience fact checked exactly what you've suggested a long time ago (even here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14741605 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14741605). But my opinion isn't very important when the information is available in a general sense, to anyone who really wants it, even now, more than a year later. Feel free to be suspicious about these resources being far downstream and non-official consumer products, but if that doesn't suffice, then other (much, much bigger) doubts occlude any potentially satisfactory assessment which won't get solved in a random thread by amateur internet detectives like us.