There were at least three occasions in the 60s when it looked like BW would have to end (from memory, there were speculative attacks in '62 and '65, France left

There were at least three occasions in the 60s when it looked like BW would have to end (from memory, there were speculative attacks in '62 and '65, France left the Gold Pool in '67...which btw, should have meant that BW was over). The reason you don't know about them is because they aren't like crises that we have today and you have to read about the period (I did my undergrad thesis on it). But if you start talking about how we need to go back...then these crises are very important. Specifically, if you look at British monetary policy: they were in the worst position because they couldn't print fake gold but couldn't devalue (and internal devaluation was politically impossible) because it might cause BW to break down, then you would see what I am talking about...I have no idea what the rest of the third paragraph means. No the risks weren't independent. Again, if you understand what happened in the 1960s then you would realise they weren't. The whole point of the period is that they tried to make it independent, and it didn't work (this isn't wholly true, all central bankers knew it wouldn't work, France in particular, but they saw no other option). This is not to say that it cannot work...China is a perfect example of it working, it worked during WW2...but the issue is that it causes your economy to malfunction because you remove competition entirely which results in high prices and high taxes (it also isn't that feasible today politically as it requires a significant amount of intervention in day-to-day life i.e. foreign currency rationing, banning certain financial assets like gold, etc.). Again though, the proof is that no-one who has actually lived in the system you are describing thinks it works. For example, China's policymakers would certainly prefer to have a market-based system of finance right now, and they clearly understand how important it was to open their trade account to competition (although they did continue do so in a somewhat limited fashion). And no, your understanding of the financial crisis is not correct. Ireland socialised losses during the GFC, before the Euro crisis. But the reason for doing that is exactly in line with what you are saying. If you want to limit the damage of speculative finance, then you socialise losses. That is what happens in China, it is what happened during WW2, it is what happens when you have don't a freely floating currency (which is what you are suggesting), and it happened in the 60s (the only reason the speculative attacks in the 60s were fended off were huge loans from central banks to Britain to ensure they didn't devalue and trigger a speculative attack on the dollar).The only new issue that the GFC raised was the wisdom of mixing the payment system into banks. If I had to boil down the mistakes you are making (aside from not reading about the actual events that occurred): the reason we came here is because there is no other choice. You cannot control speculative forces and have a productive economy, it is one or the other. But the other mistake you are making is assuming that the only way to limit the effect of capitalism is by doing weird dictatorial stuff they even knew was stupid six decades ago (like trade controls, which Trump is trying now). Again, Denmark is a perfect example: they have one of the most capitalistic societies anywhere (probably more so than the US) and just use social policy to limit the damage...without interfering in the market. It works fine. The issue is that most people believe (or are told) that it is a black or white choice (there is a correlation here with the political system, adversarial-style democracy isn't particularly effective).