> "Was Darwin/Einstein wrong?" Isn't Kuhn rather about false/wrong not being applicable when comparing paradigms, and the controversy about Morris taking this

> "Was Darwin/Einstein wrong?" Isn't Kuhn rather about false/wrong not being applicable when comparing paradigms, and the controversy about Morris taking this a bit too general? Edit: On a semiotic level, we may describe Kuhn's approach as being about homonymous signifiers, which belong to different world-views or frameworks, by which they are also defined, while Kripke refers to the special case of names, which serve as an identifier pointing to an atomic entity, which may be extended or even merge with another one, but essentially remains this particular object, which is in turn generalized by Morris to apply to all classes and types of signified objects (rather reminding of the concept of the "referred" than of the more modern concept of cultural entities). Notably, 'truth' is in the first case more an effect of structure and social consensus, in the latter case a matter of discernible properties which may be assessed as facts.