4 ms·

Looks like... It's just a Nitrokey Pro with different branding, nothing special. But this is how open hardware designs should work, and having multiple vendors

Looks like... It's just a Nitrokey Pro with different branding, nothing special. But this is how open hardware designs should work, and having multiple vendors is good. edit: the hardware design is nearly identical, but not the firmware. See my follow-up post.

shazow 8y ago
From the post: > One of the most exciting opportunities the Librem Key opens up to us is in integrating with our tamper-evident Heads BIOS to provide cutting-edge tamper-evident security but in a convenient package that doesn’t exist anywhere else. ... > We have worked with Nitrokey to add a custom feature to our Librem Key firmware specifically for Heads. This custom firmware along with a userspace application allows us to store the shared secret from the TPM on the Librem Key instead of on a phone app. Then when Heads boots, if the BIOS hasn’t been tampered with the TPM will unlock its copy of the shared secret, and Heads will send the 6-digit code over to the Librem Key. If the code matches what the Librem Key itself generated, it flashes a green light. If the codes don’t match, it flashes a red light.
simcop2387 8y ago
Looks like hardware wise that's true, but from the article they've added what looks like a challenge response type mode that the key informs you about (based off totp?) so that you can say that the bios has validated itself to the key. We have worked with Nitrokey to add a custom feature to our Librem Key firmware specifically for Heads. This custom firmware along with a userspace application allows us to store the shared secret from the TPM on the Librem Key instead of on a phone app. Then when Heads boots, if the BIOS hasn’t been tampered with the TPM will unlock its copy of the shared secret, and Heads will send the 6-digit code over to the Librem Key. If the code matches what the Librem Key itself generated, it flashes a green light. If the codes don’t match, it flashes a red light. I can't say I know how secure or safe this is going to be without examining it in detail myself (and even then i'm an amateur at cryptography stuff) but it sounds like a good start to things.
- bcaa7f3a8bbc 8y ago
  > I can't say I know how secure or safe this is going to be without examining it in detail myself I've been working on something about Heads (a minimal Linux-based secure bootloader) since January, too. And I can say the boot verification used by Heads is sound and solid. The implementation is basically a verified/measured boot scheme with TOTP. During initialization, you generate a random TOTP key, add the key to your TOTP authentication device (e.g. Google Authenticator on mobile phone), and "seal" the key in your TPM, along with your boot "measurements". During the boot process, these "measurements", or the SHA hashes of various information/configuration about hardware, software and firmware, is being passed to the TPM. If the configuration has changed, the TPM will refuse to release the TOTP secret, otherwise, the TOTP key is released, then used to calculate a random number by a shell script in Heads. If the number on your mobile phone matches with the number on the screen, then it proves the system is not being tampered. Read the code here: https://github.com/osresearch/heads/blob/584c07042ef4898de52ba4981997211c646b75fd/initrd/bin/gui-init#L93 https://github.com/osresearch/heads/blob/584c07042ef4898de52... https://github.com/osresearch/heads/blob/584c07042ef4898de52ba4981997211c646b75fd/initrd/bin/unseal-totp https://github.com/osresearch/heads/blob/584c07042ef4898de52... (yes, all shell scripts... I'm not sure whether this is a security issue, but this design is probably inspired by the initrd/sysvinit shell scripts) Obviously, it means every time you boot your computer, it requires you to check the 6-digit code against your phone, before it boots the actual Linux kernel, or enter your full-disk encryption key. To me, Librem Key improves it, by automating the process (as Nitrokey has TOTP functionality already), and using a simple protocol to automate the challenge-response verification. If you want to learn more, make sure to read about Heads first. https://github.com/osresearch/heads https://github.com/osresearch/heads This presentation is a good start. https://trmm.net/Heads_33c3 https://trmm.net/Heads_33c3 Attack Vectors: 1. The trustworthiness and security of the TPM. The Free Software community has historically rejected them because of the DRM aspect of "trusted" computing. But to this day, the complete DRM dystopia (where all the proprietary software is running inside Intel Management Engine, and performs DRM-related cryptography in TPM blackboxes, was it called Microsoft Palladium?) didn't turn out to be a threat, fortunately. So now even RMS acknowledged that there is no actual reason to not implementing free software security tools based on TPM. Another reason is potential backdoor, but even there is a backdoor, using it still improves security, compared to completely unprotected machines. In the future, perhaps there can be Free Hardware TPM, but not in the foreseeable future, and Heads's usage of TPM is still a big step towards security. 2. Completeness of measurements. If some software/hardware changes are not measured, or can be replayed by the attacker, the attack will not be detected. But the measurements are done collaterally by coreboot in early boot, and Heads in later boot, and to me is fairly extensive. Maybe there is still room for attacks, but difficult. Pentesters are always welcomed. BTW, man-in-the-middle attack to the entire verification process is possible, but it only has theoretical interests, as the attacker has to stay in the middle between you and your screen. 3. Another general issue is the security of the TOTP seed, like, if your Google Authenticator is hacked. The problem is somehow mitigated by using a Nitrokey/Librem Key, but the TOTP code is still running on a generic STM32F1 MCU, not the OpenPGP Card. STM32F1 is known for its tamper-nonresistance. But because of NDAs, there is currently no good alternative choices though. But still, just like TPM, I think it greatly improves the current situation so far, let's use it. It still has problems, and in the future we may do better. 4. Automation. Librem Key automates the challenge-response, unlike the original Heads, which prints the code on the screen. In the original Heads, if Heads itself is tampered, it will noticed by the user for incorrect/no code. But with automation, perhaps the attacker has a way to trick the users now? Need to check this. > and even then i'm an amateur at cryptography stuff Me too. I'm also working on a similar security token in my spare time. Hopefully, before the New Year, I can submit a Show HN. You may find it's interesting to read. Finally, all of my descriptions are based on my first-hand impressions, not necessarily facts, and totally unverified. Make sure to check the primary sources!

shazow 8y ago

From the post: > One of the most exciting opportunities the Librem Key opens up to us is in integrating with our tamper-evident Heads BIOS to provide cutting-edge tamper-evident security but in a convenient package that doesn’t exist anywhere else. ... > We have worked with Nitrokey to add a custom feature to our Librem Key firmware specifically for Heads. This custom firmware along with a userspace application allows us to store the shared secret from the TPM on the Librem Key instead of on a phone app. Then when Heads boots, if the BIOS hasn’t been tampered with the TPM will unlock its copy of the shared secret, and Heads will send the 6-digit code over to the Librem Key. If the code matches what the Librem Key itself generated, it flashes a green light. If the codes don’t match, it flashes a red light.

simcop2387 8y ago

Looks like hardware wise that's true, but from the article they've added what looks like a challenge response type mode that the key informs you about (based off totp?) so that you can say that the bios has validated itself to the key. We have worked with Nitrokey to add a custom feature to our Librem Key firmware specifically for Heads. This custom firmware along with a userspace application allows us to store the shared secret from the TPM on the Librem Key instead of on a phone app. Then when Heads boots, if the BIOS hasn’t been tampered with the TPM will unlock its copy of the shared secret, and Heads will send the 6-digit code over to the Librem Key. If the code matches what the Librem Key itself generated, it flashes a green light. If the codes don’t match, it flashes a red light. I can't say I know how secure or safe this is going to be without examining it in detail myself (and even then i'm an amateur at cryptography stuff) but it sounds like a good start to things.

bcaa7f3a8bbc 8y ago
> I can't say I know how secure or safe this is going to be without examining it in detail myself I've been working on something about Heads (a minimal Linux-based secure bootloader) since January, too. And I can say the boot verification used by Heads is sound and solid. The implementation is basically a verified/measured boot scheme with TOTP. During initialization, you generate a random TOTP key, add the key to your TOTP authentication device (e.g. Google Authenticator on mobile phone), and "seal" the key in your TPM, along with your boot "measurements". During the boot process, these "measurements", or the SHA hashes of various information/configuration about hardware, software and firmware, is being passed to the TPM. If the configuration has changed, the TPM will refuse to release the TOTP secret, otherwise, the TOTP key is released, then used to calculate a random number by a shell script in Heads. If the number on your mobile phone matches with the number on the screen, then it proves the system is not being tampered. Read the code here: https://github.com/osresearch/heads/blob/584c07042ef4898de52ba4981997211c646b75fd/initrd/bin/gui-init#L93 https://github.com/osresearch/heads/blob/584c07042ef4898de52... https://github.com/osresearch/heads/blob/584c07042ef4898de52ba4981997211c646b75fd/initrd/bin/unseal-totp https://github.com/osresearch/heads/blob/584c07042ef4898de52... (yes, all shell scripts... I'm not sure whether this is a security issue, but this design is probably inspired by the initrd/sysvinit shell scripts) Obviously, it means every time you boot your computer, it requires you to check the 6-digit code against your phone, before it boots the actual Linux kernel, or enter your full-disk encryption key. To me, Librem Key improves it, by automating the process (as Nitrokey has TOTP functionality already), and using a simple protocol to automate the challenge-response verification. If you want to learn more, make sure to read about Heads first. https://github.com/osresearch/heads https://github.com/osresearch/heads This presentation is a good start. https://trmm.net/Heads_33c3 https://trmm.net/Heads_33c3 Attack Vectors: 1. The trustworthiness and security of the TPM. The Free Software community has historically rejected them because of the DRM aspect of "trusted" computing. But to this day, the complete DRM dystopia (where all the proprietary software is running inside Intel Management Engine, and performs DRM-related cryptography in TPM blackboxes, was it called Microsoft Palladium?) didn't turn out to be a threat, fortunately. So now even RMS acknowledged that there is no actual reason to not implementing free software security tools based on TPM. Another reason is potential backdoor, but even there is a backdoor, using it still improves security, compared to completely unprotected machines. In the future, perhaps there can be Free Hardware TPM, but not in the foreseeable future, and Heads's usage of TPM is still a big step towards security. 2. Completeness of measurements. If some software/hardware changes are not measured, or can be replayed by the attacker, the attack will not be detected. But the measurements are done collaterally by coreboot in early boot, and Heads in later boot, and to me is fairly extensive. Maybe there is still room for attacks, but difficult. Pentesters are always welcomed. BTW, man-in-the-middle attack to the entire verification process is possible, but it only has theoretical interests, as the attacker has to stay in the middle between you and your screen. 3. Another general issue is the security of the TOTP seed, like, if your Google Authenticator is hacked. The problem is somehow mitigated by using a Nitrokey/Librem Key, but the TOTP code is still running on a generic STM32F1 MCU, not the OpenPGP Card. STM32F1 is known for its tamper-nonresistance. But because of NDAs, there is currently no good alternative choices though. But still, just like TPM, I think it greatly improves the current situation so far, let's use it. It still has problems, and in the future we may do better. 4. Automation. Librem Key automates the challenge-response, unlike the original Heads, which prints the code on the screen. In the original Heads, if Heads itself is tampered, it will noticed by the user for incorrect/no code. But with automation, perhaps the attacker has a way to trick the users now? Need to check this. > and even then i'm an amateur at cryptography stuff Me too. I'm also working on a similar security token in my spare time. Hopefully, before the New Year, I can submit a Show HN. You may find it's interesting to read. Finally, all of my descriptions are based on my first-hand impressions, not necessarily facts, and totally unverified. Make sure to check the primary sources!