> the court found for the plaintiff on a technicality, but they upheld the principle that disparate impact could be sufficient to support a claim. No, they did

> the court found for the plaintiff on a technicality, but they upheld the principle that disparate impact could be sufficient to support a claim. No, they didn't. The majority opinion did conclude that disparate impact is cognizable under ADEA, but it specifically addressed whether it would apply to the claim in that case and found that it wouldn't. There was a technicality (no relevant practice identified) but the court went further than that. > Turning to the case before us, we initially note that petitioners have done little more than point out that the pay plan at issue is relatively less generous to older workers than to younger workers. They have not identified any specific test, requirement, or practice within the pay plan that has an adverse impact on older workers. As we held in Wards Cove, it is not enough to simply allege that there is a disparate impact on workers, or point to a generalized policy that leads to such an impact. Rather, the employee is “ ‘responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities.’ ” 490 U.S., at 656 (emphasis added) (quoting Watson, 487 U.S., at 994). Petitioners have failed to do so. Their failure to identify the specific practice being challenged is the sort of omission that could “result in employers being potentially liable for ‘the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances … .’ ” 490 U.S., at 657. In this case not only did petitioners thus err by failing to identify the relevant practice, but it is also clear from the record that the City’s plan was based on reasonable factors other than age. > [...] > Thus, the disparate impact is attributable to the City’s decision to give raises based on seniority and position. Reliance on seniority and rank is unquestionably reasonable given the City’s goal of raising employees’ salaries to match those in surrounding communities. In sum, we hold that the City’s decision to grant a larger raise to lower echelon employees for the purpose of bringing salaries in line with that of surrounding police forces was a decision based on a “reasonable factor other than age” that responded to the City’s legitimate goal of retaining police officers. Cf. MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 772 (CA11 1991). > While there may have been other reasonable ways for the City to achieve its goals, the one selected was not unreasonable. Unlike the business necessity test, which asks whether there are other ways for the employer to achieve its goals that do not result in a disparate impact on a protected class, the reasonableness inquiry includes no such requirement. > Accordingly, while we do not agree with the Court of Appeals’ holding that that the disparate-impact theory of recovery is never available under the ADEA, we affirm its judgment. The opinion is very approachable, I genuinely encourage you to try reading it.[0] I don't know where you're getting your facts from but they're objectively inaccurate. > That's very hypocritical of you. You're right, I'm sorry for that. [0] https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-1160.ZO.html https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-1160.ZO.html