4 ms·
A large conspiracy would be caught instantly. But it doesn't have to be a conspiracy. If people know they can vote multiple times and can't get caught (and w/
by travisoneill1 8y ago
A large conspiracy would be caught instantly. But it doesn't have to be a conspiracy. If people know they can vote multiple times and can't get caught (and w/o checking ID I don't see how they can) a certain number will decide to do so. I can't say how often this occurs, but how can you even measure it to determine if there is a problem without some sort of ID verification system at the polls?
- richmarr 8y agoI don't think it's a problem that happens, though. If you're going to fraudulently rig an election it's vastly cheaper to do so by rigging the polling station than it is by faking the voters. But by introducing voter ID systems you are very likely to skew elections away from the people least likely to possess accepted ID, i.e. the lowest socio-economic groups.
- travisoneill1 8y ago> I don't think it's a problem that happens, though But how do you know. That's the issue. If P is the probability of getting caught, and C is the number of people caught then N ~= C/P. With our current system it seems like P is close to 0 so even with C = 0 there could be a lot of successful attempts. Rigging a polling place is not viable because it would require coordination between multiple people and leave a clear mathematical trail after. So I would say that, including detection after the fact, that P > 0.5 and that the fact that it hasn't been caught means that N = 0. > But by introducing voter ID systems you are very likely to skew elections away from the people least likely to possess accepted ID, i.e. the lowest socio-economic groups. This is pretty much separate from my point but I am also skeptical about this. If someone can get to the polling place, stand in a line, and do paperwork to vote, then why could they not do pretty much the same thing to get an ID?
- beat 8y agoApples and oranges. Polling costs nothing; ID costs money. Polling places are usually within walking distance of home (at least in urban areas); license bureaus are scattered and distant. My polling place is two blocks from my house. I can walk there, vote, and be home in 20 minutes. Last time I had to renew my license, it was a three hour ordeal that cost me money and an afternoon of work, and the nearest station is miles from my house (in a dense city).
- travisoneill1 8y agoThis is a good point. Would be fine with SSN as a unique identifier with no paperwork presented. Would be as easy to fake as current system, but would generate an obvious signal when there is a fake number or collision.
- richmarr 8y ago> Rigging a polling place is not viable because... This argument is sounds great but doesn't match reality https://i.redditmedia.com/NITi8srtcW0xIfOQXPZda6zJNrpb_jRbwgkIzE8sRv0.png?w=628&s=868dd89ca7495e8ea0d49926dcb274df https://i.redditmedia.com/NITi8srtcW0xIfOQXPZda6zJNrpb_jRbwg... Edit: Link to the paper: http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/early/2012/09/20/1210722109.full.pdf http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/early/2012/09/20/1210722109...
- beat 8y agoOk, rigging a polling place in a well-designed system under rule of law is not viable. Consider the Minnesota example. In MN, all physical ballot handling, whether marked or unmarked, sealed or unsealed, must be done in the presence of members of at least two different political parties. Since the only ways to rig an election at the polling place are to either add, remove, or substitute ballots, this makes such fraud extremely difficult to do, especially at scale.
- beat 8y agoOf course it's possible. And it probably happens. But can it realistically affect the outcome of an election? As I've said, about 1.5M people vote in Minnesota alone. Altering the outcome by 1% would require 15,000 additional votes. And this would need to be completely one-sided, so the "anyone can do it" threat you bring up should cluster around the mean - about the same number of "extra" votes are cast for each side. Don't get caught up in scope issues. The problem we are trying to solve here is the legitimacy of elections. Does a little noise around the edges actually undermine the legitimacy of the outcome? Can it do so? Also, remember there ain't no such thing as a free lunch. Any mechanism that detects multiple votes by the same individual will produce a number of false positives - thus denying people who are not cheating of their vote. This is actually the pernicious, immoral logic of Voter ID laws in the US. They're marketed as ways to prevent fraud, but the actual intent is to reduce turnout in certain (mostly poor) communities. This is why support for these laws is so deeply partisan - one party is pushing for them, and one is fighting them, and the party pushing for them isn't actually that interested in fraud. Their political interest is partisan advantage, and their mechanism is misleading citizens about their intent, so people will tolerate what should be intolerable.
- travisoneill1 8y agoScope and distribution is a good point, and I'm not trying to say that this is an issue that routinely affects elections (and if it is I would look at small local elections with tiny turnout), but it can't be disproven in the current system and this is a problem. A system that ties each registered voter to a unique ID which is basically implemented for you if you require ID at the polls will have a false positive rate of ~0 much lower than our current system. This is actually a side benefit.
- beat 8y agoThat fails to address my points, either that there will be a cost in false positives (have fun stopping that), or that the motivation for making political hay out of this is partisan advantage from the false positives, not actually reducing a threat to democracy.