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Here in NY (and I'm sure in many other places), you manually mark up a paper ballot with your vote. You then insert it into a scanner which confirms the ballot
by CydeWeys 8y ago
Here in NY (and I'm sure in many other places), you manually mark up a paper ballot with your vote. You then insert it into a scanner which confirms the ballot's validity and then drops it into a lockbox.
The votes can be tallied instantaneously through the electronic system, but if there's any irregularities the lockboxes can be opened and manually counted as verification. And you can open a small number of randomly selected lockboxes every election anyway, even absent any suspected wrongdoing, just as a check to verify that the electronic counts are working as expected.
How is this not the standard everywhere? Yes, there's more paper (and thus expense) involved, but surely having a non-hackable paper trail is worth it to protect our democracy?
I was at DEF CON the first time they did the voting machine hacking. Those did not fill me with confidence.
- mtgx 8y agoHow do you tell if something goes wrong? I think what's often missing in these discussions is a need for automatic audits, too, even if not full audits initially but only for a small sample. If there is anything wrong found in that first series of audits, then a full audit should be requiered by law and there should be severe prison punishments for those state officials failing to start and finish those audits in the specified time after the election. Corrupt state officials should not be able to create any sort of delays or use them as an excuse.
- gregmac 8y agoI'm not sure how it's handled now, but what I'd like to see is after the election closes, a random method to select poll locations is used -- such as a lottery ball machine -- and those locations are then required to do a manual recount. No one has advance notice of which poll locations will do this, so there's no opportunity for cheating (eg, turning off a defeat device at the locations that will be audited). If there are any differences in the count then additional locations are required to also do a manual count, and if more than two locations have differences, all electronic numbers are trashed and the whole election is counted manually.
- CobrastanJorji 8y agoIn order to defeat this system, the attacker would need control of the lottery ball machine. But we're already assuming that the attacker has control over some of the election machines, so while this is still strictly better, it's small comfort.
- stonesixone 8y agoThis is basically what San Francisco, CA does. They use 3 10-sided dice to randomly choose 1% of ~600 precincts to manually audit. You can watch the random selection for the June 2018 election here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wLSLlBkFY-Y https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wLSLlBkFY-Y
- beat 8y agoHow do you tell if something goes wrong? Well, if you hand-count a voting machine, and it gives you a different result from the machine, then you know something went wrong. And if you hand-count a bunch of machines and they all have the same misbehavior, then it's time for throwing out the machine count altogether.
- XorNot 8y agoIn Australia it's all hand-count, with machine count for verification. Specifically ballots are sorted by volunteers on election night to do the preferential voting, and then the stacks are counted and checked by essentially bill-counting style machines. Discrepancies mean someone else does a count and recount. The key to all of this is involving as much of the public as possible though: democracy is government by the people for the people, the people need to be involved in its operation. The only way you dispel the idea of rigging is by ensuring a large plurality of your population was involved each time and would attest to their neighbors that they saw no misbehavior. Electronic voting is based on trying to take people out of the process - it misses the point.
- Klathmon 8y agoThis is the point I always try to hammer home. The inclusivity of paper voting is amazing. It doesn't matter if you are young or old, black or white, highly educated or illiterate, rich or poor, just about everyone can count ballots. And if you think someone is trying to fuck you over, you too can go count along or watch that ballot box all day to ensure nobody is tampering with it. Get a few hundred people in the same room that all don't trust one another and all count along. That's how you run an election.
- specialist 8y agoaka a recount. Rules vary by jurisdiction. eg When a contest is close. Some places already do partial recounts. It is expensive. Most jurisdictions don't have the budget.
- rootusrootus 8y agoOne thing I'd like to see is that every ballot gets a UUID assigned when it is cast. You get a receipt. All votes get published on a public web site. You can tally the votes yourself if you want to check the accuracy of the reported totals, and you can check your own ID to see that the vote was recorded accurately. It's not a perfect idea, but I like the upsides more than the downsides.
- CobrastanJorji 8y agoThis is unfortunately dangerous. It means that you can provide proof of your vote to others. That's no good; it makes buying votes or punishing workers/family members/whoever for voting the wrong way much easier. That said, there are some really interesting non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for elections that accomplish what you're intending without this flaw. Their main downside is that, compared to tallying, they're complicated.
- pwg 8y ago> How is this not the standard everywhere? Largely because election officials are also not computer security experts (or even serious amateurs). Therefore when "big corp" comes knocking with their newfangled electronic touch screen voting system that promises fast, effortless tallies and "security" (it's, right there, the box is checked on the ad brochure...) the election officials have no background with which to be skeptical of "big corp"'s products re. security. And with the promise of "effortless, instant, tallies" (vs. a long overnight counting paper manually) they see the newfangled thing as an improvement over that which they do understand (the long overnight counting paper).
- specialist 8y agoThe election administrators I've met are knowledgable. This is IT. When have the technical experts been empowered to make purchasing decisions?
- headShrinker 8y agoTo know, is to know what you don’t know. If you are buying IT and you aren’t sure about some spec, security apparatus or venerability, then you can’t be considered knowledgeable. No one can be expected to know everything but then they should be surrounding themselves with experts and counseling with them ad nauseam
- dzdt 8y agoNY's system is pretty good. Something you don't mention but is another nice bit is they have poll observers from each major party watching at each elction site. One thing they don't have but I wish for is that, after the machine-count totals are in, each party represented should be able to name a small number of precincts for an audit/hand recount. Parties at this point have pretty good modelling of expected results at a precinct level. That would give a cheap way to get lots of certainty against tampering of the machine vote counting.
- prlyons 8y agoGeorgia had a very similar system, at least in my county, in the late 1990's. Then after the 2000 election we threw away the convenience of electronic tallies with the security of paper back up for the Diebold touch systems. I always feel like voting with those machines is just theater. There's no way for me to validate my vote.
- mongol 8y agoThis is not bad. Need to think about it... edit: Consider it is scanned after voting has closed instead, during counting. Does that change the characteristics of this system with respect to trust etc?
- CydeWeys 8y agoThat would give up one very valuable feature, namely, that scanning it at the time you're voting gives you immediate feedback about the validity of your ballot. If you accidentally voided your ballot by voting for more than the allowed # of candidates in any given election, or if you didn't bubble in the ovals properly and it can't read them, then your ballot will be rejected and you can fill in a new one. If you wait to scan until after voting has closed, then the person's vote will be thrown away instead of fixed. Also, how are you going to scan all these ballots after voting has closed? That would require opening up the lockbox, which tampers with the security of the system. Plus, you're no longer getting results instantly; you'd have to wait until the polling place is closed down, and then open up the box and scan all the ballots. What possible advantage does this have? It'd just slow everything down.