> Also, checksums of reproducible builds (a feature a lot of compilers in production now support) are a good way to know the software wasn't altered. Nobody wi

> Also, checksums of reproducible builds (a feature a lot of compilers in production now support) are a good way to know the software wasn't altered. Nobody will agree to doing that. I just said that. > Securing the hardware is more of a protocol issue than a technical one here. I wouldn't agree. Because the binary being run, isn't being run in isolation, making verifying the database difficult. [0] If we're not allowed to verify any of the internal workings of the voting machine... How can we say it actually has a copy of a verified binary on it? Random verification of a voting machine is far more intense, costly, and time-consuming than verifying that a bunch of people at the voting place are doing their jobs correctly. [0] https://www.engadget.com/2018/07/17/voting-machine-remote-access-elections/ https://www.engadget.com/2018/07/17/voting-machine-remote-ac...