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>it must also be trusted by the losers, or it's a waste of time. There is no voting scheme that is trusted by the losers. With paper ballot, you can easily cla

by fooker 8y ago

>it must also be trusted by the losers, or it's a waste of time. There is no voting scheme that is trusted by the losers. With paper ballot, you can easily claim ballot stuffing or biased counting.

Symbiote 8y ago
At least in the UK, independent observers can (and do) follow the paper trail: observe at a polling station, watch the ballot box being sealed, follow it, watch it bring unsealed, observe the count.
- fooker 8y ago
  Why does that not translate to electronic voting? We have had hash functions and digital signatures for a while.
  - shakna 8y ago
    How does one observe the binaries on a voting machine? Nobody seems willing to sign on to that [0]. When you can't audit what is in a voting machine, you can't guarantee if it works. [0] https://www.austinmonitor.com/stories/2017/10/star-vote-collapses/ https://www.austinmonitor.com/stories/2017/10/star-vote-coll...
    - fooker 8y ago
      >How does one observe the binaries on a voting machine? You can make this argument against literally any programmable machine. Also, checksums of reproducible builds (a feature a lot of compilers in production now support) are a good way to know the software wasn't altered. Securing the hardware is more of a protocol issue than a technical one here.
      - shakna 8y ago
        > Also, checksums of reproducible builds (a feature a lot of compilers in production now support) are a good way to know the software wasn't altered. Nobody will agree to doing that. I just said that. > Securing the hardware is more of a protocol issue than a technical one here. I wouldn't agree. Because the binary being run, isn't being run in isolation, making verifying the database difficult. [0] If we're not allowed to verify any of the internal workings of the voting machine... How can we say it actually has a copy of a verified binary on it? Random verification of a voting machine is far more intense, costly, and time-consuming than verifying that a bunch of people at the voting place are doing their jobs correctly. [0] https://www.engadget.com/2018/07/17/voting-machine-remote-access-elections/ https://www.engadget.com/2018/07/17/voting-machine-remote-ac...
jerf 8y ago
"There is no voting scheme that is trusted by the losers. With paper ballot, you can easily claim ballot stuffing or biased counting." Yes, there is. You can tell by the way they don't grab people and guns and start shooting. The purpose of voting is not to prevent hurt feelings or a bit of grousing. Despite the lies you may have been told, hurt feelings are inevitable. It's to prevent people who think they won, but didn't, from shooting people. And some other things too, like convincing them they'll have a fresh fair chance next time and that loss isn't permanent, but not shooting people is the main one.

by fooker 8y ago

>it must also be trusted by the losers, or it's a waste of time. There is no voting scheme that is trusted by the losers. With paper ballot, you can easily claim ballot stuffing or biased counting.

Symbiote 8y ago

At least in the UK, independent observers can (and do) follow the paper trail: observe at a polling station, watch the ballot box being sealed, follow it, watch it bring unsealed, observe the count.

fooker 8y ago
Why does that not translate to electronic voting? We have had hash functions and digital signatures for a while.
- shakna 8y ago
  How does one observe the binaries on a voting machine? Nobody seems willing to sign on to that [0]. When you can't audit what is in a voting machine, you can't guarantee if it works. [0] https://www.austinmonitor.com/stories/2017/10/star-vote-collapses/ https://www.austinmonitor.com/stories/2017/10/star-vote-coll...
  - fooker 8y ago
    >How does one observe the binaries on a voting machine? You can make this argument against literally any programmable machine. Also, checksums of reproducible builds (a feature a lot of compilers in production now support) are a good way to know the software wasn't altered. Securing the hardware is more of a protocol issue than a technical one here.
    - shakna 8y ago
      > Also, checksums of reproducible builds (a feature a lot of compilers in production now support) are a good way to know the software wasn't altered. Nobody will agree to doing that. I just said that. > Securing the hardware is more of a protocol issue than a technical one here. I wouldn't agree. Because the binary being run, isn't being run in isolation, making verifying the database difficult. [0] If we're not allowed to verify any of the internal workings of the voting machine... How can we say it actually has a copy of a verified binary on it? Random verification of a voting machine is far more intense, costly, and time-consuming than verifying that a bunch of people at the voting place are doing their jobs correctly. [0] https://www.engadget.com/2018/07/17/voting-machine-remote-access-elections/ https://www.engadget.com/2018/07/17/voting-machine-remote-ac...

jerf 8y ago

"There is no voting scheme that is trusted by the losers. With paper ballot, you can easily claim ballot stuffing or biased counting." Yes, there is. You can tell by the way they don't grab people and guns and start shooting. The purpose of voting is not to prevent hurt feelings or a bit of grousing. Despite the lies you may have been told, hurt feelings are inevitable. It's to prevent people who think they won, but didn't, from shooting people. And some other things too, like convincing them they'll have a fresh fair chance next time and that loss isn't permanent, but not shooting people is the main one.