7 ms·

Seems like I recall similar security issues being found years and years ago, back when ESS was still called Diebold and their CEO was getting in hot water for s

Seems like I recall similar security issues being found years and years ago, back when ESS was still called Diebold and their CEO was getting in hot water for saying at a GOP political fundraiser that he would “deliver Ohio to the GOP.” What’s old is new again. I ask myself time and again why voting systems aren’t federally regulated “critical infrastructure,” with source code available for public review.

hannasanarion 8y ago
Who cares if the source code is public or not? There is never going to be a way to verify that it is running on the machine when you are standing in front of it.
- underwater 8y ago
  It could prevent unintended mistakes or rogue employees from compromising the machine. A Diebold-sponsored plot is not the only vector to worry about.
- Digital-Citizen 8y ago
  There isn't a way to vet that software by using it, but there are other problems which are easily solved with software freedom (the freedom to run, inspect, share, and modify published computer software for which complete source code and build instructions are a prerequisite): the ballot layout could require changes that were unanticipated by the program's developer. A new ballot layout could require changes in every computer that deals with the ballot in any capacity (producing the page description for printing, scanning ballots for voter verification and over/under counts for example). We can't predict all of the problems that come up and that alone tells us we need to be in the best position to anticipate changes, hence respecting software freedom for all computer owners. Therefore not being able to inspect that the running voting machine is running trusted software is no reason to deny any computer own their software freedom. That's no justification for pushing voting districts into buying new voting equipment which ostensibly supports the needed change. So in the end the solution remains the same: anyone who cares about software freedom (as we all should) would care that their voting machines run on free software.
  - TylerE 8y ago
    Totally electronic balloting is bad news, period. Paper ballots, electronic tabulation. Can be recounted by hand if necessary.
    - Digital-Citizen 8y ago
      Totally electronic balloting is bad news but not what the article dismisses without evidence. I'm not for electronic tabulation by default nor do I see the need. Optically scanned voter-verifiable paper ballots will involve electronics but the tradeoff is that this arrangement conveys considerable advantages to certain voters.
- crumbshot 8y ago
  The firmware images and hardware designs should be public too, with extensive auditing of machines in the field to check for backdoors or supply chain compromise. Or, pencil and paper ballots.
SamReidHughes 8y ago
> I ask myself time and again why voting systems aren’t federally regulated “critical infrastructure,” with source code available for public review. IANAL but the Constitution. States run their own elections.

hannasanarion 8y ago

Who cares if the source code is public or not? There is never going to be a way to verify that it is running on the machine when you are standing in front of it.

underwater 8y ago
It could prevent unintended mistakes or rogue employees from compromising the machine. A Diebold-sponsored plot is not the only vector to worry about.
Digital-Citizen 8y ago
There isn't a way to vet that software by using it, but there are other problems which are easily solved with software freedom (the freedom to run, inspect, share, and modify published computer software for which complete source code and build instructions are a prerequisite): the ballot layout could require changes that were unanticipated by the program's developer. A new ballot layout could require changes in every computer that deals with the ballot in any capacity (producing the page description for printing, scanning ballots for voter verification and over/under counts for example). We can't predict all of the problems that come up and that alone tells us we need to be in the best position to anticipate changes, hence respecting software freedom for all computer owners. Therefore not being able to inspect that the running voting machine is running trusted software is no reason to deny any computer own their software freedom. That's no justification for pushing voting districts into buying new voting equipment which ostensibly supports the needed change. So in the end the solution remains the same: anyone who cares about software freedom (as we all should) would care that their voting machines run on free software.
- TylerE 8y ago
  Totally electronic balloting is bad news, period. Paper ballots, electronic tabulation. Can be recounted by hand if necessary.
  - Digital-Citizen 8y ago
    Totally electronic balloting is bad news but not what the article dismisses without evidence. I'm not for electronic tabulation by default nor do I see the need. Optically scanned voter-verifiable paper ballots will involve electronics but the tradeoff is that this arrangement conveys considerable advantages to certain voters.
crumbshot 8y ago
The firmware images and hardware designs should be public too, with extensive auditing of machines in the field to check for backdoors or supply chain compromise. Or, pencil and paper ballots.

SamReidHughes 8y ago

> I ask myself time and again why voting systems aren’t federally regulated “critical infrastructure,” with source code available for public review. IANAL but the Constitution. States run their own elections.