9 ms·

Serious design flaw in ESS ExpressVote touchscreen: “permission to cheat”

86 points by lainon 8y ago

panopticon 8y ago
Maybe I'm getting old, but using 12px font size on an article is evil.
- jancsika 8y ago
  Evil in the same way your cat stalking your foot is evil. Zoom in.
  - panopticon 8y ago
    Then you balloon the whole page content, navigation and all. I maintain that 12px font is silly for long-form content.
    - jancsika 8y ago
      I'm zoomed in at 200% on an 11" at 1366x768 and still all the text wraps cleanly within the viewport. If I want to zoom in further I can click the little book icon for reader view in Firefox, and the content will wrap without scrollbars to my heart's content. So again, evil in the same way a BDFL maintainer is a tyrant.
- r00fus 8y ago
  I'm loving the feature on hn clients like MiniHack that auto-enable readability mode for the browser when you click through to the article. It's like wearing polarized shades.
- pwg 8y ago
  Firefox -> Preferences -> Content -> Fonts & Colors -> Advanced -> Minimum font size And the problem is cleared right up.
- oh_sigh 8y ago
  Isn't that the standard size for text?
  - panopticon 8y ago
    The default in Chrome and Firefox is 16px.
on_and_off 8y ago
I have said dozens of times and I will say it again. I am a technophile, but the only sane way to vote is with pen and paper with manual counting.
- stochastic_monk 8y ago
  Everyone who is in cybersecurity or computer science says no, this is a terrible idea. The primary reason for not having a paper trail is so you or someone else can change results and not be caught. Cf. Georgia clearing its election server and degaussing its backups 3 times each when subpoenaed. [0] [0]: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/10/days-after-activists-sued-georgias-election-server-was-wiped-clean/ https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/10/days-after-activ...
  - SkyMarshal 8y ago
    So are you agreeing or disagreeing with OP? Sounds like you're disagreeing at first, but your example seems to agree.
    - nothrabannosir 8y ago
      He is corroborating and elaborating. All agreement. The example fits the thesis.
  - ComputerGuru 8y ago
    I don’t think your referenced case has anything to do with the technology. That is clear and obvious subversion of the law and destruction of evidence. If it were paper ballots instead, they could put in place “safety” and “privacy” “environmentally friendly” procedures to shred all paper trails just as easily. Laws aren’t worth a damn if you’re not willing to enforce them.
    - deleted 8y ago
      [deleted]
    - 8y ago
shakna 8y ago
I love technology... But voting machines are a bad idea, especially in their current implementations. Paper voting, with manual counting, scales well, and has far fewer attack vectors than electronic voting.
- fooker 8y ago
  "Manual banking, with humans counting cash, scales well, and has far fewer attack vectors that electronic banking.".
  - sp332 8y ago
    But that's not actually true whereas GP's is. I mean how would voting be better if we had the capacity to count billions of votes?
    - fooker 8y ago
      Not just the capacity, the verifiability and redundancy it can support. I am a little bit surprised that people at Hackernews are so hostile against technology. Sure, there are some attack vectors, but we have 4-5 decades of security research and engineering to mitigate or at least detect that. Don't throw away the baby with the bathwater.
      - brod 8y ago
        so we should build machines to tell the truth quicker and then verify the machines told the truth by using methods that do not include using machines... when machines are built to determine the truth but cannot be trusted to do so - it's (more or less) a negative sum game.
      - sp332 8y ago
        Ok well if I see any voting machines like that I might reconsider. In the meantime stick with paper.
  - Chris_Chambers 8y ago
s_m_t 8y ago
What problem are electronic voting machines supposed to solve?
- mikeash 8y ago
  Optimist: the problem of spending a lot of effort counting ballots. Cynic: the problem of voters choosing the wrong candidate.
  - MichaelApproved 8y ago
    Paper ballots and manual counting isn’t that expensive and it’s not where we should be looking to pinch pennies.
    - Digital-Citizen 8y ago
      That sounds like a far better set of priorities than commonly gets raised in discussions like these. Another benefit of electronic voting systems that mark and/or verify voter-verified paper ballots with the voter is allowing the blind and illiterate to vote alone and retain their privacy. Sighted literate voters take for granted that they don't have to reveal their vote to anyone else. This doesn't get any discussion or support in the article (quite the contrary, there's some language about how such machines are second-best to voters marking their own ballots). The paragraph discounting "BMDs" (ballot-marking devices) contains no pointer to evidence to back the assertion that voters don't check their machine-marked voter-verifiable paper ballot. This is solved with voter education -- tell voters to verify their ballots no matter how they're marked. By the logic of this claim, it's worth pointing out that humans make mistakes writing on paper too. So better to have the voter verify their own ballot. There's also no evidence given of "the dispute-resolution mechanism" for a malicious or errant machine mismarking a ballot. This excuse seems particularly reaching to me as all roads lead to the same outcome -- the voter should spoil the ballot and get a new ballot. No proof is needed to justify spoiling the ballot because in the end they're not committing fraud. Even if the voter spoils multiple ballots, that's not a big deal. I'll need evidence to see that this is a serious concern but the article presents none.
ArtWomb 8y ago
The risks in electronic vote tampering are two-fold. Not just in election hijacking by changing vote tallys. Particularly in light of state-sponsored capabilities. But also in the distrust and possible erosion of the democratic institutions and process itself. Which may constitute an existential threat. Power vested in the people. Not in machines.
- darawk 8y ago
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_systems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_sy...
hotsauceror 8y ago
Seems like I recall similar security issues being found years and years ago, back when ESS was still called Diebold and their CEO was getting in hot water for saying at a GOP political fundraiser that he would “deliver Ohio to the GOP.” What’s old is new again. I ask myself time and again why voting systems aren’t federally regulated “critical infrastructure,” with source code available for public review.
- hannasanarion 8y ago
  Who cares if the source code is public or not? There is never going to be a way to verify that it is running on the machine when you are standing in front of it.
  - underwater 8y ago
    It could prevent unintended mistakes or rogue employees from compromising the machine. A Diebold-sponsored plot is not the only vector to worry about.
  - Digital-Citizen 8y ago
    There isn't a way to vet that software by using it, but there are other problems which are easily solved with software freedom (the freedom to run, inspect, share, and modify published computer software for which complete source code and build instructions are a prerequisite): the ballot layout could require changes that were unanticipated by the program's developer. A new ballot layout could require changes in every computer that deals with the ballot in any capacity (producing the page description for printing, scanning ballots for voter verification and over/under counts for example). We can't predict all of the problems that come up and that alone tells us we need to be in the best position to anticipate changes, hence respecting software freedom for all computer owners. Therefore not being able to inspect that the running voting machine is running trusted software is no reason to deny any computer own their software freedom. That's no justification for pushing voting districts into buying new voting equipment which ostensibly supports the needed change. So in the end the solution remains the same: anyone who cares about software freedom (as we all should) would care that their voting machines run on free software.

86 points by lainon 8y ago

panopticon 8y ago

Maybe I'm getting old, but using 12px font size on an article is evil.

jancsika 8y ago
Evil in the same way your cat stalking your foot is evil. Zoom in.
- panopticon 8y ago
  Then you balloon the whole page content, navigation and all. I maintain that 12px font is silly for long-form content.
  - jancsika 8y ago
    I'm zoomed in at 200% on an 11" at 1366x768 and still all the text wraps cleanly within the viewport. If I want to zoom in further I can click the little book icon for reader view in Firefox, and the content will wrap without scrollbars to my heart's content. So again, evil in the same way a BDFL maintainer is a tyrant.
r00fus 8y ago
I'm loving the feature on hn clients like MiniHack that auto-enable readability mode for the browser when you click through to the article. It's like wearing polarized shades.
pwg 8y ago
Firefox -> Preferences -> Content -> Fonts & Colors -> Advanced -> Minimum font size And the problem is cleared right up.
oh_sigh 8y ago
Isn't that the standard size for text?
- panopticon 8y ago
  The default in Chrome and Firefox is 16px.

on_and_off 8y ago

I have said dozens of times and I will say it again. I am a technophile, but the only sane way to vote is with pen and paper with manual counting.

stochastic_monk 8y ago
Everyone who is in cybersecurity or computer science says no, this is a terrible idea. The primary reason for not having a paper trail is so you or someone else can change results and not be caught. Cf. Georgia clearing its election server and degaussing its backups 3 times each when subpoenaed. [0] [0]: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/10/days-after-activists-sued-georgias-election-server-was-wiped-clean/ https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/10/days-after-activ...
- SkyMarshal 8y ago
  So are you agreeing or disagreeing with OP? Sounds like you're disagreeing at first, but your example seems to agree.
  - nothrabannosir 8y ago
    He is corroborating and elaborating. All agreement. The example fits the thesis.
- ComputerGuru 8y ago
  I don’t think your referenced case has anything to do with the technology. That is clear and obvious subversion of the law and destruction of evidence. If it were paper ballots instead, they could put in place “safety” and “privacy” “environmentally friendly” procedures to shred all paper trails just as easily. Laws aren’t worth a damn if you’re not willing to enforce them.
  - deleted 8y ago
    [deleted]
  - 8y ago

shakna 8y ago

I love technology... But voting machines are a bad idea, especially in their current implementations. Paper voting, with manual counting, scales well, and has far fewer attack vectors than electronic voting.

fooker 8y ago
"Manual banking, with humans counting cash, scales well, and has far fewer attack vectors that electronic banking.".
- sp332 8y ago
  But that's not actually true whereas GP's is. I mean how would voting be better if we had the capacity to count billions of votes?
  - fooker 8y ago
    Not just the capacity, the verifiability and redundancy it can support. I am a little bit surprised that people at Hackernews are so hostile against technology. Sure, there are some attack vectors, but we have 4-5 decades of security research and engineering to mitigate or at least detect that. Don't throw away the baby with the bathwater.
    - brod 8y ago
      so we should build machines to tell the truth quicker and then verify the machines told the truth by using methods that do not include using machines... when machines are built to determine the truth but cannot be trusted to do so - it's (more or less) a negative sum game.
    - sp332 8y ago
      Ok well if I see any voting machines like that I might reconsider. In the meantime stick with paper.
- Chris_Chambers 8y ago

s_m_t 8y ago

What problem are electronic voting machines supposed to solve?

mikeash 8y ago
Optimist: the problem of spending a lot of effort counting ballots. Cynic: the problem of voters choosing the wrong candidate.
- MichaelApproved 8y ago
  Paper ballots and manual counting isn’t that expensive and it’s not where we should be looking to pinch pennies.
  - Digital-Citizen 8y ago
    That sounds like a far better set of priorities than commonly gets raised in discussions like these. Another benefit of electronic voting systems that mark and/or verify voter-verified paper ballots with the voter is allowing the blind and illiterate to vote alone and retain their privacy. Sighted literate voters take for granted that they don't have to reveal their vote to anyone else. This doesn't get any discussion or support in the article (quite the contrary, there's some language about how such machines are second-best to voters marking their own ballots). The paragraph discounting "BMDs" (ballot-marking devices) contains no pointer to evidence to back the assertion that voters don't check their machine-marked voter-verifiable paper ballot. This is solved with voter education -- tell voters to verify their ballots no matter how they're marked. By the logic of this claim, it's worth pointing out that humans make mistakes writing on paper too. So better to have the voter verify their own ballot. There's also no evidence given of "the dispute-resolution mechanism" for a malicious or errant machine mismarking a ballot. This excuse seems particularly reaching to me as all roads lead to the same outcome -- the voter should spoil the ballot and get a new ballot. No proof is needed to justify spoiling the ballot because in the end they're not committing fraud. Even if the voter spoils multiple ballots, that's not a big deal. I'll need evidence to see that this is a serious concern but the article presents none.

ArtWomb 8y ago

The risks in electronic vote tampering are two-fold. Not just in election hijacking by changing vote tallys. Particularly in light of state-sponsored capabilities. But also in the distrust and possible erosion of the democratic institutions and process itself. Which may constitute an existential threat. Power vested in the people. Not in machines.

darawk 8y ago
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_systems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_sy...

hotsauceror 8y ago

Seems like I recall similar security issues being found years and years ago, back when ESS was still called Diebold and their CEO was getting in hot water for saying at a GOP political fundraiser that he would “deliver Ohio to the GOP.” What’s old is new again. I ask myself time and again why voting systems aren’t federally regulated “critical infrastructure,” with source code available for public review.

hannasanarion 8y ago
Who cares if the source code is public or not? There is never going to be a way to verify that it is running on the machine when you are standing in front of it.
- underwater 8y ago
  It could prevent unintended mistakes or rogue employees from compromising the machine. A Diebold-sponsored plot is not the only vector to worry about.
- Digital-Citizen 8y ago
  There isn't a way to vet that software by using it, but there are other problems which are easily solved with software freedom (the freedom to run, inspect, share, and modify published computer software for which complete source code and build instructions are a prerequisite): the ballot layout could require changes that were unanticipated by the program's developer. A new ballot layout could require changes in every computer that deals with the ballot in any capacity (producing the page description for printing, scanning ballots for voter verification and over/under counts for example). We can't predict all of the problems that come up and that alone tells us we need to be in the best position to anticipate changes, hence respecting software freedom for all computer owners. Therefore not being able to inspect that the running voting machine is running trusted software is no reason to deny any computer own their software freedom. That's no justification for pushing voting districts into buying new voting equipment which ostensibly supports the needed change. So in the end the solution remains the same: anyone who cares about software freedom (as we all should) would care that their voting machines run on free software.