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The gold standard for the USA is the Australian Ballot. Private voting, public counting. What makes it work is the one-way hash of dropping your ballot into th
by specialist 8y ago
The gold standard for the USA is the Australian Ballot. Private voting, public counting.
What makes it work is the one-way hash of dropping your ballot into the ballot box.
There is no non-paper system that can match that quality for our form of elections.
Anyone who wants to improve election integrity, paper or otherwise, would advocate for simplification. The two biggest wins would be: Switching from winner-takes-all to approval voting would make our elections less brittle. Issuing separate ballots for federal, state, local would simplify ballot processing.
- Spivak 8y ago> There is no non-paper system that can match that quality for our form of elections. Let me take a stab at one: Each precinct has a number of voting machines on a local network. Voting machines print a paper receipt viewable by the voter. When the polls close the precinct has an instant count for a preliminary report that can be verified after the fact by a scanner/humans.
- specialist 8y agoIt's good to think these things thru. Nicely done. There are two holes with respect to our current system of voting. #1 It's not immediately obvious, but the order which voters sign-in is preserved, as is the order the ballots are cast. So it's trivial to identify each voter's ballot. One variant of this idea is some kind of ballot marking device. Mark or print the ballot, tabulate it separately. This can have value for accessibility reasons. But doesn't add anything to the current processes. #2 Your idea is generally known as the voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT). Research and experience has shown that voters mostly do not review their ballots before casting. Further, there's no reason to believe what you cast is what was recorded. In fact, one of the times I observed a random "audit" of the VVPAT, when administrators encountered a problem (cheap thermal printer shredded the output), they just put the memory card in a new device and reprinted the VVPAT. So the only thing being verified was that the printer worked. A variant of the VVPAT is to give voters some kind of receipt. Then later they could verify that their vote was cast and counted correctly. But just having a receipt allows someone to verify how you voted, destroying the secret ballot. There are proposals for using some kind of crypto to obfuscate the actual votes, but still allow one to see their votes were counted. Suspending disbelief for a second, the reason these systems don't work for our elections is because of information leakage. All the crypto based systems rely on some kind of hash collision, to hide your ballot in the herd of ballots. Unfortunately, with our small precincts and complicated ballots, collisions are rare. So even after hashing your ballot would be uniquely identifiable. To make such systems feasible, we'd have to increase the herd (bigger precincts), or simplify the ballots (perhaps splitting federal, state, local races on to their own ballots).