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IME questions like this typically come from people who don't deal with the bureaucracy of applying for visas very often, if at all. You assume fear of being bo

IME questions like this typically come from people who don't deal with the bureaucracy of applying for visas very often, if at all. You assume fear of being bombed or hijacked, but it's really to make international travel easier and more efficient. Lack of a reliable way to verify identity is a major reason why applicants for admission (or applicants for a visa) are assumed "guilty until proven innocent", and a ton of people are denied visas (or denied entry) every day on the slightest reasons as a result. Being able to verify someone identity biometrically makes international travel and immigration more trustworthy, which makes it politically more palatable to make the lives of travelers and immigrants easier. And doing this on outbound flights is no different from doing it on inbound flights - from the host government's perspective, they need to know when people enter and leave.

wahern 8y ago
But this has nothing to do with ports of entry or consular offices. It has to do with boarding at the gate. 99% accuracy is not remotely accurate enough to even begin replacing personnel at sensitive entry points. And consider that to the extent you automate security you permit automating measures to subvert the system. The reported accuracy of these solutions describe efficacy for typical use cases; they're not a measure of resilience to attack, which is what people often assume. Again, I'm not saying these things don't have their uses. Security just isn't one of them unless they're merely part of a larger, cohesive system (e.g. used to verify efficacy of auditing and reporting systems). In fact, they may decrease security if you rely on them as strong security measures.
- diebeforei485 8y ago
  Outbound and inbound verification are sides of the same coin, as you need both in order to reliably track overstays. Congress has recognized this since 1996 when they first passed legislation requiring biometric entry-exit, and multiple times since then. The exit part of that has never really been implemented except for small trials. It really isn't about replacing personnel (that another strawman you've made up, after the strawman about weapons). Rather - instead of humans (TSA agent + gate agent), it's now a human and a machine. It helps that the kind of mismatches made by CNN's are generally different from those made by humans. > And consider that to the extent you automate security you permit automating measures to subvert the system. I'm not sure what you mean by automating measures to subvert the system - there are financial and physical barriers (you'd need to get a hundred people or more into an airport, and buy them all plane tickets) If you have that level of resources, you're better off bribing CBP officers[1]. [1] https://www.businessinsider.com/customs-border-agents-mexican-cartel-smuggling-2016-11 https://www.businessinsider.com/customs-border-agents-mexica...

wahern 8y ago

But this has nothing to do with ports of entry or consular offices. It has to do with boarding at the gate. 99% accuracy is not remotely accurate enough to even begin replacing personnel at sensitive entry points. And consider that to the extent you automate security you permit automating measures to subvert the system. The reported accuracy of these solutions describe efficacy for typical use cases; they're not a measure of resilience to attack, which is what people often assume. Again, I'm not saying these things don't have their uses. Security just isn't one of them unless they're merely part of a larger, cohesive system (e.g. used to verify efficacy of auditing and reporting systems). In fact, they may decrease security if you rely on them as strong security measures.

diebeforei485 8y ago
Outbound and inbound verification are sides of the same coin, as you need both in order to reliably track overstays. Congress has recognized this since 1996 when they first passed legislation requiring biometric entry-exit, and multiple times since then. The exit part of that has never really been implemented except for small trials. It really isn't about replacing personnel (that another strawman you've made up, after the strawman about weapons). Rather - instead of humans (TSA agent + gate agent), it's now a human and a machine. It helps that the kind of mismatches made by CNN's are generally different from those made by humans. > And consider that to the extent you automate security you permit automating measures to subvert the system. I'm not sure what you mean by automating measures to subvert the system - there are financial and physical barriers (you'd need to get a hundred people or more into an airport, and buy them all plane tickets) If you have that level of resources, you're better off bribing CBP officers[1]. [1] https://www.businessinsider.com/customs-border-agents-mexican-cartel-smuggling-2016-11 https://www.businessinsider.com/customs-border-agents-mexica...