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Well, yes, DNS is spoofable. The solution is, and has always been, DNSSEC. This just makes it slightly more urgent to start using it.
by teddyh 8y ago
Well, yes, DNS is spoofable. The solution is, and has always been, DNSSEC. This just makes it slightly more urgent to start using it.
- eximius 8y ago> Fragmented DNS responses happen occasionally with DNSSEC It is not clear that DNSSEC helps in this case. Given just the text (and my unfamiliarity with DNS protocols on the wire) it seems to imply this occurs because of DNSSEC. EDIT: > In the meantime, DNSSEC does actually protect against this vulnerability, but it does require that your domain is signed and that your CA validates. This may not yet be the case. Nevermind.
- tptacek 8y agoDNS is virtually never spoofed in practice because of a combination of (1) sensitive systems being built to assume the DNS was already insecure and (2) the settings where DNS spoofing is useful are already so insecure than DNS security doesn't do much to help you (for instance, coffee shop wireless). In practice, there are two significant targets for DNS spoofing: 1. SMTP email, where TLS isn't universally required among MTAs. 2. CA domain validation. For problem (1), we has SMTP STS, which simply establishes a long-term requirement for TLS between a pair of MTAs, sidestepping the spoofing problem. For problem (2), there is a whole panoply of countermeasures to DNS spoofing, erratically deployed across a variety of CAs. CAs do not as a rule do strict DNSSEC validation (it's too broken), but many of them do multi-perspective lookups which make packet-level spoofing tricky to accomplish in practice. The real solution to this problem isn't a government-run PKI that forklifts in a whole new DNS protocol, but rather a culling of CAs that can't deploy adequate countermeasures against these attacks. Note that the Usenix paper illustrates scenarios in which DNSSEC makes this attack easier, not harder.
- tialaramex 8y ago> CAs do not as a rule do strict DNSSEC validation (it's too broken), but many of them do multi-perspective lookups which make packet-level spoofing tricky to accomplish in practice. Can you give specific examples of "many of them" doing multi-perspective DNS today ?
- tptacek 8y agoCan't. But if I've given the impression that the majority of CAs are sophisticated, that wasn't intentional.
- tialaramex 8y agoSo to be clear: You say DNSSEC validation is "too broken" for any public CA to be doing that, but actually the largest (by issuance volume) does exactly that Whereas you say multi-perspective is so prevalent "many of them" do it, but you aren't able to produce any examples at all. Maybe time for a re-think?
- dane-pgp 8y agoJust to clarify, it is a "government-run" PKI in the sense that some governments control some TLDs, as opposed to the CA ecosystem where a single rogue (government-run) CA can issue a certificate for any domain (happily ignoring any CAA record). It would be nice to have something like Certificate Transparency for DNSSEC (at least for the TLDs), but for now CT has the problem that it is only a requirement for new certs, and a rogue CA could backdate a cert they maliciously created for your domain.
- notafraudster 8y agoNaive question: Is there any reason, given that my registrar allows me to turn on DNSSEC, that I shouldn't? Any negative consequences or things I need to account for? Or is this a no duh move?
- tptacek 8y agoYes: if you DNSSEC-sign your domain but don't keep up maintenance of it, your domain will vanish off the Internet for users behind strict-validating DNS caches. That happened to HBO NOW for all Comcast users the week they rolled out. (You'd also be participating in a government-run PKI but I'm not assuming your politics preclude you from doing so).
- regecks 8y ago> but don't keep up maintenance of it Not sure about this phrasing. It's not on the domain owner to maintain anything, you just need to not forget you have DNSSEC enabled if you move your zone to different NS. It's up to your DNS host to handle things like key rollovers and most people aren't writing and running their own authoritative DNS servers. Regardless, the risk vs reward is still heavily in favor of not signing. It is so sparsely deployed that it can't be relied upon for anything (like DANE) and it seems like DoH (both for clients and between resolvers) may end up being the better way forward.
- tptacek 8y agoIn addition to DoH, there's already a direct-to-domain-registrar protocol in the works for the CA problem. DNSSEC is, I think, pretty much dead.
- cpach 8y ago”there's already a direct-to-domain-registrar protocol in the works for the CA problem” Sounds interesting. Are there any drafts/discussions available?
- gerdesj 8y agoDNSSEC is probably the way forward. However it is bloody awful to implement, OK it isn't really but it is hard (not the same thing). I suggest that DNSSEC evangelists look at how Let's Encrypt are doing things for TLS certs and learn a few lessons. Just in case I've put a nose out of joint: on a brand new Ubuntu Bionic minimal install with a NAT port forward to 80/tcp from WAN, I can get a LE cert with: # apt install certbot # certbot -d systemname.example.co.uk Fill in a few questions as required and off we go. There is a systemd timer unit that automatically renews certs or you can use cron. Naively using both by accident does not matter. In general the LE system just works because clients have been designed to work like that (my general experience here is only Linux - Windows and Apples may have a different experience) Now, DNSSEC has not been handled like LE. Window's DNS daemon seems to have DNSSEC built into the GUI (mmc) from at least 2012R2. The options on Linux and others are not quite so easy.