3 ms·

One only exposes you to the spy, the other exposes you to every other malicious actor on the internet.

criddell 8y ago
If Apple includes an additional public key in the list of keys that can decrypt an iMessage, how are you now exposed to every other malicious actor on the internet? There are things handset makers could do that would allow law enforcement access to a device without compromising the security of every person using that device. For example, they could add a connector to the logic board that grants access to the keys after a fuse is blown. It would only work on devices that law enforcement have in their possession and once they blow the fuse, the device is otherwise useless so you don't have to worry about using a device that's been compromised. It could even be designed so that the extracted key is encrypted and can only be decrypted by Apple after they receive physical possession of the phone and a court order. A scheme like this would individual phones that law enforcement have in their possession to be accessed. It wouldn't allow mass decryption and so normal users are still protected. That seems like a reasonable compromise to me.
- michaelmrose 8y ago
  This would ruin the physical security of lost devices wherein the attacker is willing to ruin the device. This is worse than key escrow because it ruins the physical security all all devices everywhere. At least with key escrow we could laughably pretend that the government would keep their master keys secure. You are suggesting that all portable devices ship with security that can be defeated with a screw driver and hoping nefarious people don't react by installing actual security in software.
  - criddell 8y ago
    > This would ruin the physical security of lost devices wherein the attacker is willing to ruin the device. Only if they could also secure Apple's cooperation. That's what I was addressing when I said "the extracted key is encrypted and can only be decrypted by Apple".
    - michaelmrose 8y ago
      Ok you are right I missed that. However Once apple has the keys to the kingdom what is stopping the government making apple give the government such keys ensuring that no warrant is required. What is stopping users from using software that is ACTUALLY secure.
      - criddell 8y ago
        > what is stopping the government making apple give the government such keys ensuring that no warrant is required The same thing that's stopping them from silently requiring Apple to include backdoors into every device today. > What is stopping users from using software that is ACTUALLY secure. It's the same as with a regular phone line. Users are free to speak in code or use an analog scrambler. Just because a particular interception technique isn't perfect doesn't mean it wouldn't be valuable to law enforcement.
- deleted 8y ago
  [deleted]
iainmerrick 8y ago
No, both depend on how careful the eavesdropper is about safeguarding their special access. Both could be secure (as secure as planned, anyway) but both add some extra risk. There are practical differences, sure, but it’s all the same principle.

If Apple includes an additional public key in the list of keys that can decrypt an iMessage, how are you now exposed to every other malicious actor on the internet? There are things handset makers could do that would allow law enforcement access to a device without compromising the security of every person using that device. For example, they could add a connector to the logic board that grants access to the keys after a fuse is blown. It would only work on devices that law enforcement have in their possession and once they blow the fuse, the device is otherwise useless so you don't have to worry about using a device that's been compromised. It could even be designed so that the extracted key is encrypted and can only be decrypted by Apple after they receive physical possession of the phone and a court order. A scheme like this would individual phones that law enforcement have in their possession to be accessed. It wouldn't allow mass decryption and so normal users are still protected. That seems like a reasonable compromise to me.

michaelmrose 8y ago
This would ruin the physical security of lost devices wherein the attacker is willing to ruin the device. This is worse than key escrow because it ruins the physical security all all devices everywhere. At least with key escrow we could laughably pretend that the government would keep their master keys secure. You are suggesting that all portable devices ship with security that can be defeated with a screw driver and hoping nefarious people don't react by installing actual security in software.
- criddell 8y ago
  > This would ruin the physical security of lost devices wherein the attacker is willing to ruin the device. Only if they could also secure Apple's cooperation. That's what I was addressing when I said "the extracted key is encrypted and can only be decrypted by Apple".
  - michaelmrose 8y ago
    Ok you are right I missed that. However Once apple has the keys to the kingdom what is stopping the government making apple give the government such keys ensuring that no warrant is required. What is stopping users from using software that is ACTUALLY secure.
    - criddell 8y ago
      > what is stopping the government making apple give the government such keys ensuring that no warrant is required The same thing that's stopping them from silently requiring Apple to include backdoors into every device today. > What is stopping users from using software that is ACTUALLY secure. It's the same as with a regular phone line. Users are free to speak in code or use an analog scrambler. Just because a particular interception technique isn't perfect doesn't mean it wouldn't be valuable to law enforcement.
deleted 8y ago
[deleted]

iainmerrick 8y ago

No, both depend on how careful the eavesdropper is about safeguarding their special access. Both could be secure (as secure as planned, anyway) but both add some extra risk. There are practical differences, sure, but it’s all the same principle.