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As I read the evidence, you're only fucked if your OPSEC is weak. Sure there have been lots of high-profile takedowns. But I only know of one case where a bug i
by mirimir 8y ago
As I read the evidence, you're only fucked if your OPSEC is weak. Sure there have been lots of high-profile takedowns. But I only know of one case where a bug in Tor per se compromised users. That was CMU exploitation of the relay-early bug. That's how they got PlayPen. And then they ran it as a honeypot, serving phone-home malware, and nailed lots of users.
But in every other case that I'm aware of, OPSEC failure led to pwnage. Freedom Hosting. Silk Road 1. Sheep Marketplace.
So can you point to another case where defects in Tor design or practice got people pwned? I doubt it. But even so, I am concerned that the absence of such news just reflects parallel construction.
And finally, it's not enough to just rely on Tor. In my opinion, one should always use Tor through a nested VPN chain, comprising servers from at least three different VPN providers. That way, adversaries must compromise both Tor and the VPN services. Also, it's crucial to never run servers in places that can be associated with you. Because the more traffic there is, especially if an adversary can control traffic flow, the easier it is to do traffic correlation.
- pdkl95 8y ago> you're only fucked if your OPSEC is weak The problem is that actually implementing not-weak OPSEC is much harder than most people understand (even those with technical backgrounds). For example, is your "secret" activity on TOR easily tied to your non-secret activity from a search of network entry/exit times (i.e. "secret" activity is the complement "non-secret" activity)? I recommend Zoz's DEFCON talk, "Don't Fuck It Up!"[1], for a very good overview of how hard OPSEC has become. [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1q4Ir2J8P8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1q4Ir2J8P8
- mirimir 8y agoTrue. Good OPSEC is nontrivial. But in my case, all of my online activity uses part of the same nested VPN chain. Then I branch the chain for opennet vs Tor traffic. So an adversary would need to get data from multiple VPN providers, just to know what involved Tor. And it's not at all very hard.[0] Also, about OPSEC, see my review.[1] 0) See https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides/advanced-privacy-and-anonymity-part-1 https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides/advanced-privacy-and-ano... 1) https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides/online-privacy-through-opsec-and-compartmentalization-part-1 https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides/online-privacy-through-o...