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You can opt in personal accounts to APP can't you? Or are you just saying it's not easy to enforce?
by rrdharan 8y ago
You can opt in personal accounts to APP can't you? Or are you just saying it's not easy to enforce?
- idlewords 8y agoI'm arguing that it's a nonstarter to hand campaign staff who had not heard of security keys at the start of the meeting an easily breakable dongle and say this is the only way to get in to your email now; don't lose it. They need fallbacks (like security codes or Google Authenticator).
- godzillabrennus 8y agoSeems like the threshold for caring if a staffer loses email access was crossed when the DNC got hacked. Seems more reasonable to lose an account to a damaged key than to lose an election.
- idlewords 8y agoHaving your finance manager lose access to spreadsheets for four days is also not tenable. The trade-offs are complicated here.
- solatic 8y ago... that's why you have backup security keys, numbered per account, in a safe in campaign offices.
- idlewords 8y agoOne of the candidates I've trained tours his district full-time in a campaign Winnebago, and doesn't have a campaign office. He interacts with his staff mostly remotely. Almost every candidate is constantly on the road. It's not that people are lazy or feckless. This is a genuinely hard problem for working campaigns to solve. It's a fascinating environment.
- solatic 8y agoThat doesn't mean that his campaign staff are going to constantly lose their security keys. Losing a security key is an infrequent-enough occurrence that the inconvenience of needing to go to campaign headquarters to get a new key shouldn't be too onerous, not to mention that the inconvenience of showing up in person to get a new key serves as the real motivator not to lose the key in the first place. Look, even security keys may not provide "enough" security. An adversary capable of performing a targeted, in-physical-range attack will be able to sneak a keylogger onto a staffer's laptop (to steal the password) and then take advantage of an opportunity where the security key isn't guarded to swipe the security key for either momentary access or to register the attacker's key for long term access - which won't be caught without persistent auditing efforts, which most campaigns won't do. As always, the question is "how do we raise the cost of an attack while keeping the cost of defense relatively low" and that's what security keys do really well. Edit: look, specific campaigns may have different ways of adopting the pattern. Maybe the candidate without a dedicated campaign office could keep the keys in a safe in the candidate's home. Maybe national candidates / candidates whose staffers would need to drive for an unreasonable amount of time to get a replacement key, maybe there can be local caches of keys in different cities, where some independent business figures out a way to register numbered security keys for online accounts in a relatively anonymous way for both remote businesses and whoever else. Still doesn't mean that security keys are a bad idea.
- idlewords 8y agoWithout any rancor, I would encourage you to volunteer on a nearby campaign and watch them in action with this scenario in mind.